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Abstract 
 
The nature of employee retirement plans has changed dramatically over the past fifteen 
years as employers have been replacing traditional defined benefit retirement plans with defined 
contribution plans like the 401(k) plan. This dissertation is focused on the impact that 401(k) 
plan have on household asset accumulation. The first essay looks at how much asset 
accumulation can be attributed to 401(k) plans as opposed to other factors such as 
demographics and saver type characteristics. Overall, the conclusions are consistent with recent 
research that says these plans induce a reshuffling of assets rather than being funded through a 
reduction in consumption. Controlling for cohort effects reduces the amount of wealth 
attributable to 401(k) eligibility to a negligible (and statistically insignificant) amount. The 
second essay considers the impact that borrowing against the assets in 401(k) plan might have 
on household asset accumulation. Most personal finance advice warns against borrowing 
against a retirement plan because of the potential negative impact on retirement wealth. This is 
especially true for borrowers who are also undisciplined savers and do not or cannot maintain 
their retirement plan contributions during loan period or who separate from their employers 
before the loan is repaid. For good savers a retirement plan loan only has a modest impact on 
retirement wealth. Only modest make-up contributions would need to be made to mitigate the 
impact of a retirement plan loan. It seems that many borrowers may be using retirement loans 
because they are in financial difficulty. It also appears that borrowers are trying to maintain 
their retirement savings, but their asset accumulation within broader measures of wealth is 
below that of households that do not have outstanding 401(k) loans  
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Introduction 
Retirement planners think of retirement security as a three-legged stool, with the legs 
being income received from Social Security, a reliance on private savings, and finally income 
from employer provided pension. Over the past fifteen years the employer provided leg has been 
undergoing a dramatic change with the responsibility for this leg shifting from employers to 
employees. When we think of an employer provided pension we generally think of a defined 
benefit plan. In a defined benefit plan an employee receives a monthly payment whose amount 
is calculated using a formula based on their length of service and final salary (or an average of 
the last years’ salaries). By the mid 1990s, much attention was focused on a different kind of 
retirement plan in which employees made contributions to their own private account, about 
which they could make the investment decisions, with the expectation that this account would 
become their own retirement nest egg. These accounts are called defined contribution plans and 
the 401(k) plan, named after the relevant section of the tax code, is the most common kind of 
plan.1 
There are several reasons for this shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans. Regulatory burden is an important reason. As regulators sought to provide greater 
protections to employees’ retirement income, companies became less willing to provide these 
defined benefit plans. In addition, the manufacturing industry, most certainly because of high 
labor union concentration, is a large provider of defined benefit pension coverage. As the 
percentage of the labor force that is employed in manufacturing has decreased, so has defined 
benefit pension coverage. 
The largest implication of this shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans is 
that the responsibility and risks for the employer provided leg increasingly rests with the 
employee. Among these responsibility and risks are participation decisions, investment 
                                                        
1 Public employees have a similar kind of plan called a 403(b) plan. From an employees point of view there is little 
difference between a 401(k) and 403(b) plan. 
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decisions, return risks, and longevity risks. There is generally no participation decision with 
regards to defined benefit plans. This pension coverage is included as part of an employee’s 
contract. However, participation in a 401(k) plan does require an active decision to participate 
by the employee. It is interesting to note that according to the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) about 25 to 30 percent of households eligible for a 401(k) plan do, in 
fact, decline participation. Employees also must decide how much to contribute to their 401(k) 
plans and in which investment options to place them. In defined benefit plan it is the 
responsibility of the employer to set aside enough funds and invest them wisely enough so that 
the plan is able to meet the financial obligations to its current and future retirees; that is, that 
the plan is not “underfunded”. In a 401(k) plan, an employee has no recourse should they fail to 
make contributions enough to provide for an adequate retirement. Nor is there any recourse 
should the investment decisions made by an employee result in poor returns. Recently this has 
led some to question whether 401(k) plans are the panacea they were perceived to be during the 
late 1990s when employees saw their 401(k) plan balances grow due to an ever increasing stock 
market. Finally, the holder of 401(k) plan has no protection against longevity risk should they 
outlive the assets in the plan, while the obligation of a defined benefit plan is to provide the 
monthly payments for the life of the retiree. 
This dissertation is concerned with the employer provided pension leg of the retirement 
security stool. Specifically, it examines two issues of interest with respect to 401(k) plans: 
whether the plans are achieving their policy goal of increasing household saving and the 
determinants and impact of borrowing against the assets in a 401(k) plan. 
The first essay examines the extent to which the assets in a 401(k) plan could be 
considered new savings rather than a reshuffling of existing household assets. While households 
are making use of these plans (the average balance in 2001 in a 401(k) plan among households 
that are eligible for a plan was $38,145), it is possible to offset these funds by reducing other 
savings (i.e. by not making contributions to a savings account). The literature has reached 
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varying conclusions. Some of the early literature found a very definite new savings effect while 
later attempts that challenged the methodology found much less of an effect. The first essay 
examines the new savings issue using recent high quality wealth data and controls for lifecycle 
effects. The extent to which households accumulate assets as they age is an important 
determinant of saving that has not been previously addressed in this literature. After controlling 
for these lifecycle effects I find an almost negligible effect that the plans have on household asset 
accumulation. 
An intriguing feature of many 401(k) plans is the ability to borrow the funds for use 
before retirement. This is generally against the advice of almost any financial planner because of 
the potential to undermine retirement wealth. In the second essay, I examine three issues with 
regards to borrowing. First, I examine the characteristics of households that have an 
outstanding loan against their 401(k) plan; then I examine the impact that borrowing could have 
on retirement wealth; finally, I compare asset accumulation of households with outstanding 
loans with those that do not. The conclusions from this essay are that households with 
outstanding loans appear to be in worse financial shape and worse savers than households 
without loans, that borrowing could have only a small impact on retirement wealth if the 
household continues to make contributions to the plan while repaying the loan, and that 
households with loans appear to be maintaining their retirement assets, however their overall 
wealth may be worsening over time. 
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Chapter 1: 401(k) plans and (No) New Savings:  
Evidence from Recent Survey Data Using Cohort Analysis 
Introduction 
Whether or not the baby boom generation will have accumulated enough assets to 
provide for an adequate retirement has become an increasingly important concern. While most 
workers will receive social security benefits in their retirement, it’s not certain that they are 
saving enough in other forms. One reason for this focus on non-social security wealth is the 
trend in employer-sponsored pensions that has occurred in the past twenty years. Fewer and 
fewer employers are offering the traditional employer funded defined benefit retirement plan 
where employees receive a set amount each month based on their length of service and final 
salary. Instead employers have been offering defined contribution plans, where an individual 
employee’s (and—sometimes—their employer’s) contributions are accumulated in an account 
that accrues investment returns until retirement. The account is then used as a source of 
retirement income. According to the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (US 
Department of Labor (2001-2002)) in 1983, defined contribution plans accounted for 70.95 
percent of all pension plans. Fifteen years later defined contribution plans accounted for 92.27 
percent of pension plans. As figure one shows, twenty years ago contributions to defined benefit 
plans were slightly greater than contributions to defined contribution plans; since then 
contributions to defined contribution plan have grown at an annual rate of 5.89 percent so that 
in 1998 defined contribution plan contributions were nearly four times greater than in 1984 
while defined benefit plan contributions were seventy five percent of their 1984 level. The 
401(k)2 plan is the most common defined contribution plan, accounting for approximately 70 
percent of all account type plans. 401(k) plans are provided by the private sector; employees in 
the public sector have access to 403(b) plans, which are very similar to the 401(k) and are 
included with 401(k) plans in the analysis in this paper. 
                                                        
2 Named after the relevant section in the tax code. 
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Figure one: Contributions to defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans (millions of dollars) 
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There are several implications of this shift in pension coverage.3 Most importantly in 
defined contribution plans the burden and risk of ensuring retirement income rest with 
individual employees who have the responsibility for making decisions about participation and 
the amount of contributions to the plan, choosing among investment options, bearing 
investment risk in case of poor asset returns, and bearing the longevity risk in case they outlive 
the assets in the plan.4 In contrast, in defined benefit plans the employer bears all of these 
burdens.5 
401(k) plans have several features that make them attractive programs for saving for 
retirement. When firms offer a 401(k) plan they must make them available to most employees—
and not just highly compensated ones—in order to receive favorable tax treatment. Secondly, 
employee contributions are made with pre-tax earnings, so income tax is deferred until 
withdrawal, presumably at a lower tax rate in retirement; in addition, the employer often 
                                                        
3 See William G. Gale and Joseph M. Milano (1998) for a discussion of the implications of the shift from defined 
benefit to defined contribution plans. 
4 Retirees can insure against longevity risk by purchasing an annuity. 
5 The most important issue in defined benefit plans seems to be the underfunding that exists if the present value of 
its future pension obligations is greater than the plan’s assets. These arouse concern especially during market 
downturns. See Simon Kwan (2003) or Russell W. Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (2002) for more information. 
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voluntarily matches a portion of the employee contributions.6 Third, the IRS imposes a 10 
percent penalty for withdrawals made before the age of 59 ½ in order to discourage the use of 
retirement funds for pre-retirement consumption. Because of these features these plans are 
sometimes referred to as “savings incentive plans” and have recently been expanded to include 
other reasons for savings such as a child’s education (education IRA) or for future medical 
expenses.7 During the boom years of the 1990s 401(k) plans achieved almost mythical status as 
participants saw their account balances grow in line with large stock market returns. The 
subsequent downturn and horror stories of employees in failed corporations such as Enron 
losing much of their nest egg gave rise to magazine articles with titles such as “Can We Fix the 
401(?)” (Money, April 2003). This somewhat tempered the enthusiasm for these plans. Given 
the risks noted above and the regulatory burden of administrating these plans, employers are 
unlikely to return to offering defined benefit plans. 
Clearly 401(k) plans will continue to play an increasingly important role in Americans’ 
retirement savings plans. A recent Gallup poll (Gallup, 2004) finds that 57 percent of non-
retired Americans are very or moderately worried about their retirement income. While only 20 
percent of currently retired individuals surveyed use their 401(k), IRA or other retirement 
account as a major source of retirement income, 54 percent of non-retired Americans expect 
their 401(k) plans to be a major source of retirement income. An important and unresolved 
empirical question is whether 401(k) plans do achieve their stated goal of encouraging savings. 
While total assets in defined contribution plans increased from $280 billion (or $9,600 per 
participant) in 1983 to $2 trillion (or $36,000 per participant) in 1998 (US Department of 
Labor, 2001-2002), judging the effectiveness of the plans needs to consider whether these assets 
                                                        
6 The tax reforms of 2000 increased the contribution limit to $11,000 in 2002 rising to $15,000 in 2006; it also 
allowed for “make-up” contributions for individuals older than 50 years old. 
7 It seems that every few years there are proposals in Congress to change the tax code to better help people save. A 
cynic might note that while the proposals generally decrease an individual’s lifetime tax liability they likely trigger a 
short-term increase in government revenue as taxes usually need to be paid on roll-overs of assets from old saving 
plans to the new plans. 
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are a result of shifting from non-401(k) assets and represent savings that would have occurred in 
the absence of the plan or whether they are indeed new savings. For example, as a direct way of 
substitution households could simply save less in their regular savings or brokerage accounts in 
amounts equal to their retirement plan contributions. A more subtle way of substitution would 
be to take on more debt than otherwise would be the case in the absence of the program. For 
example, a household could increase their 401(k) balance by $1000, purchase an automobile, 
see they have don’t have as much in their checking accounts as before, and reduce their down 
payment by adding a thousand dollars to the car note. Both transactions increase 401(k) 
balances; the first leaves net financial assets and net worth unchanged, while the second would 
show an increase in net financial assets but leave net worth unchanged. These scenarios 
highlight the importance of checking a number of assets classes for possible sources of 
substitution. Overall, the evidence is contradictory, with some research indicating that 401(k) 
plans have increased savings, while other research finds little or no evidence to support this 
conclusion. This paper wades into the controversy and offers another perspective. I hope to 
advance the literature in several respects. First, I use recent and high quality data. Much of the 
research uses data from the 1980s and early 1990s, about the time that defined contribution 
plans began experiencing their dramatic growth. Secondly, I track age cohorts; that is, I follow 
over time groups that were the same age in a particular year. This allows me to take into account 
lifecycle savings effects that may not have been fully controlled for in prior research. The 
conclusions of this essay are broadly consistent with the “substitution” camp as there is little 
evidence, especially in the cohort analysis, that 401(k) plans lead to new savings. Other factors 
likely explain the instances where patterns of asset accumulation may suggest 401(k) plans 
result in new savings. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review the literature relevant to the 
“new savings or substitution” issue. Then, I describe the methodology and data used. Third, I 
describe some recent trends in retirement savings and 401(k) plans, then present results that 
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would be considered an update to a recent paper (Karen Pence, 2001) closely related to this 
paper. I also examine the results for a sample of households with less than one million dollars of 
net worth. Then I examine the results of tracking cohorts for my full sample. Finally, I offer a 
concluding discussion. 
Literature Review 
In this section, I first look at the most relevant literature—the substitution versus new 
savings issue—then I briefly consider how retirement savings relate to the broader savings 
literature. 
The primary fit of this essay is within the literature that considers whether tax incentive 
savings plans such as IRAs and 401(k) plans increase household savings or are a substitute for 
other forms of savings. The results are inconclusive as one group of researchers favors the 
substitution argument and another group finds evidence of a “new savings” effect. The earliest 
work focuses on Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) as these were more widespread earlier 
than 401(k) plans. Although both IRAs and 401(k) plans were authorized in the 1970s, the tax 
reforms of 1982 caused a large increase in the use of IRAs while the 401(k) plan gained 
widespread use later in the 1980s and early 1990s. An example of the work on IRA plans is 
Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise (1990)8 who argue that increasing the limit on IRA 
contributions in the 1980s would have resulted in substantial increases in IRA contributions, 
two-thirds coming from reductions in consumption with very little from reductions in other 
assets. William G. Gale and John Karl Scholz (1994)9 find the opposite to be true as most IRA 
savers tend to already have substantial non-IRA assets or are older than age 59 and do not face 
the penalty for early withdrawal. To determine if IRA savings represent new savings means 
determining if the IRA contributions would have been made in absence of the IRA program; 
households with large amounts of financial assets may find it easier to shuffle assets to IRAs. 
Gale and Scholz also note the importance of controlling for unobservable differences of saver 
                                                        
8 Along with James Porterba these are the primary “new savings” camp researchers. 
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type. For example, two people may be alike in observable aspects like age, education, and 
income yet one may be inclined to save more than the other. If the inclination to save more is 
not accounted for then higher balances for participants in a savings program could wrongly be 
attributed to the savings program and not the saver type. 
In the late 1980s households began contributing more to 401(k) plans than to IRAs. 
James Porterba, Steven Venti, and David Wise (1995) attempt to determine if 401(k) 
contributions are substitutes and  they avoid the saver heterogeneity issue by comparing the 
change in asset balances among “like savers”. They divide the sample based on 401(k) eligibility 
and IRA contributor status. Using a series of cross sections from 1984 to 1991, they examine the 
changes in assets of these homogeneous saver groups by comparing, for example, asset balances 
of a typical 40 year old in 1984, 1987, and 1991. An important assumption in these comparisons 
is that the only difference between a 40 year old in each of these of these years is that the 1987 
group had three more years (and the 1991 group six more years) of exposure to 401(k) plans 
than the 1984 group and the 1991 group had six more. If 401(k) plans were substituting for other 
forms of saving then they would expect non-401(k) savings of eligible families to have declined 
between 1984 and 1991. For households eligible for 401(k) plans their median total financial 
assets were 17 percent larger in 1991 compared to 1987 while the non-IRA-401(k) financial 
assets remained nearly unchanged. For families not eligible for 401(k) accounts their median 
financial assets were also nearly unchanged for the same four-year time period. 
In a comment to a paper by Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz (1994) 
B. Douglas Bernheim (pages 152 – 166) offers several comments on the attempt to determine 
the substitutability of saving incentive programs. The early work on IRA and 401(k) plans uses 
data from the early 1980s until 1991 during which the use of IRAs and 401(k) plans expanded 
considerably. Bernheim notes that it is likely that the types of individuals using these accounts 
had also changed. For example, the first owners of 401(k) plans may have been very good savers 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
9 These are the primary “savings incentive plans are substitutes” authors. 
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while the later participants may have been lesser savers. If true, this makes comparing asset 
balances over this time span problematic because the saver types in the later group may be 
much different than the earlier groups. This criticism may be countered by using more recent 
data, after 401(k) plans were well established in workplaces. Some recent efforts, such as Karen 
Pence (2001), and this paper, use recently available data where 401(k) eligibles and other saver 
groups are more likely to be homogeneous over time. Another concern is that the Venti and 
Wise (1990) and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) studies examine only net financial assets. If 
401(k) plans are being funded from non-financial assets then financial assets would increase 
leaving the impression of new savings, when they are, in fact, being offset by some other, 
illiquid, asset. More recent research (Engen and Gale (2000) and Pence (2001)) emphasize this 
point and draw conclusions based on net worth as well as net financial assets. Finally, the tax 
deductibility of contributions means that national savings is lowered. An important policy 
implication is that even if these plans raise personal savings their overall impact could also be 
judged by how much—if at all—they raise national savings. Addressing this issue Daniel J. 
Benjamin (2003) concludes that about 25 percent of 401(k) balances in 1991 represent new 
national savings while also finding that about half of the balances are new private savings. 
In principle, there should be no reason to focus on retirement savings versus other forms 
of savings. In classical savings models10 agents engage save in order to smooth consumption 
over time. The work of Robert Hall (1978), Angus Deaton (1991), and Christopher D. Carroll 
(1997) introduces income uncertainty so that a precautionary savings motive arises in order to 
have a “buffer-stock” of savings in case of negative income shocks. In these models, households 
with higher income uncertainty should have higher savings.11 Most models of savings behavior 
have not included an explicit retirement period (David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy 
Tobacman (1998) and Ian Irvine and Susheng Wang (2001) are recent exceptions) so it is not 
                                                        
10 There are many descriptions of such models. John Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995) or Christian Gollier (2000) 
chapters 15 and 16 are two examples. 
11 See Christopher D. Carroll and Andrew A. Samwick (1997) for empirical support of this idea. 
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certain how retirement might affect savings behavior except to say that households need to 
accumulate assets for retirement.12  
Households often say that they are saving inadequately for retirement and feel they lack 
the discipline required for good savings habits. This presents a difficulty for classical models. 
Unless households experience frequent negative income shocks their savings should be enough 
for a known period of zero income in the future. Recent work in behavioral economics, such as 
David Laibson’s (1997) widely cited Golden Eggs model, considers the difficulty households have 
in long term planning. These models adjust the discount function so that the distant future is 
discounted more heavily than the near future, which leads to preference reversals. For example, 
agents may say they want to begin saving more for retirement “tomorrow” yet when tomorrow 
arrives, they spend rather than save promising to begin saving the “next tomorrow”. Such 
hyperbolic discounters13 look for mechanisms to bind their future behavior. For example, 
Richard Thaler and Sholomo Benartzi (2001) describe a saving plan they have implemented in 
which employees choose to have a portion of future pay increases and bonuses automatically 
placed in a savings account in order to remove the temptation to spend it. Likewise, retirement 
savings plans such as IRAs and 401(k) plans should help participants commit to a savings course 
of action by providing either incentives for maintaining or penalties for deviating from a prior 
plan. Most plans also take away the paycheck-to-paycheck savings decision by providing 
automatic payroll deduction of employee designated contributions. Even in the absence of 
penalties and incentives the plans could act as mental accounts in the Hersh M. Shefrin and 
Richard H. Thaler (1988) sense. While 401(k) programs should help households have more 
savings, there are reasons to think that this may not always be the case. A General Accounting 
Office (1997) reports that households may be reluctant to participate in such savings programs if 
                                                        
12 There are empirical studies of how retirement affects the portfolio choices of households. See James M Poterba, 
John B. Shoven, and Clemens Sialm (2004) or John Y. Campbell, Joao F. Cocco, Francisco J. Gomes, and Pascal J. 
Maenhoutt (1999). 
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they do not have access to their funds. This highlights the importance of plan design: features 
such as the penalty for early withdrawal, and the ability to borrow or access the funds prior to 
retirement may encourage participation or savings in one household but do the opposite for 
another.14 In addition, if households are optimally saving to reach a wealth goal then tax 
incentive savings plans allow them make the same pre-tax contributions and reach their goal 
earlier or save less and still achieve their savings goal. 
Data and Methodology 
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a triennial survey conducted on behalf of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the most recently available was conducted from 
March to October of 2001. The SCF collects very detailed information on US household finances, 
such as types of assets owned and their values, amount and types of debt and loans owed, 
detailed demographic information on household members, and a number of opinion variables 
that can proxy for saver type in data analysis. Surveys prior to 1995 have a less accurate 
definition of 401(k) plan eligibility, so I use the three most recent surveys: 1995, 1998, and 2001. 
Each survey interviews different sets of households so there are three separate cross sections 
rather than one panel data set; each wave of the SCF could be thought of as a balance sheet of 
American household finances. The SCF is also considered to be among the highest quality of 
wealth data available (Richard T Curtin, F. Thomas Juster and James N. Morgan (1989)). As 
table one indicates approximately about 4,300 are interviewed in each survey with almost half 
being included in my sample of households where either the head of the household is less than 
64 years old in 1995, 67 in 1998, or 70 in 2001, and the head or the spouse is working for 
someone else and neither is self-employed.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
13 Compared with the more usual exponential discount function. See Choice Over Time (1992), Laibson (1997), and 
Laibson, Repetto and Tobbacman (1998) for more details regarding how the hyperbolic discount function leads to 
preference reversals. 
14 See James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian (2004) for a survey of plan design issues. 
15 The self-employed have separate savings incentive programs and are excluded from the samples of the related 
research mentioned earlier. See Laura Power and Mark Rider (2002) for a discussion of the impact of these 
programs on the self-employed. 
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Table One: Sample Descriptive statistics 
 
 1995 SCF  1998 SCF                  2001 SCF 
Number of households questioned in SCF 4,299  4,305  4,442 
(Unweighted) number of households in sample 
(Head or spouse working, neither self-
employed, not older than 64 in 1995) 
1990  1940  1950 
Weighted percentage of dataset in sample 55.89%  56.35%  53.04% 
Percentage in sample that is eligible for 401(k) 
plan 46.26%  54.33%  53.04% 
Percentage of eligibles that participate in 
401(k) plan 68.29%  76.65%  76.15% 
 
This essay follows previous literature by examining the difference-in-differences (see 
Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (2000, chapter 13) for a discussion and example of this approach and 
Engen and Gale’s (2000) work for a derivation of the equation for estimating savings behavior 
within income groups). The essence of this approach is to compare changes between households 
eligible for 401(k) plans with those that are ineligible. If the assets for households that are 
eligible for 401(k) plans are increasing faster over time than ineligible households, then this is 
taken as evidence in support of 401(k) plans increasing savings. Following Poterba, Venti and 
Wise's (1995) eligibility experiment, the literature compares eligible and ineligible households, 
rather than participating and non-participating households. Since employees choose 
participation and firms choose eligibility Benjamin (2003) notes it is more plausible that 
eligibility—given observed household characteristics—is conditionally random than 
participation is. 
A concern in tracking savings behavior over time is to properly account for lifecycle 
effects. In typical lifecycle models (see Martin Browning and Thomas F. Crossley (2001) or 
Christopher D. Carroll (2001) for discussions of lifecycle models of saving and consumption) 
households borrow when young, repay this debt and accumulate assets when middle-aged, and 
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draw down these assets when old. Analysis that does not properly account for these lifecycle 
effects may wrongly attribute asset growth to a 401(k) plan savings effect instead of to the 
lifecycle effect. A unique feature of this paper is that the savings behavior of cohorts—groups of 
people born in the same calendar year—are tracked over successive cross-sections of data in 
order to disentangle lifecycle from 401(k) savings effects.16 An advantage of using panel data is 
that an individual’s behavior can be tracked over time. This is not possible using cross-sectional 
data like the SCF since different households participate in each survey. However, cohort analysis 
does allow me to examine life-cycle effects. For example, I can follow asset accumulation of 30 
year olds in 1995, 33 year olds in 1998, and 36 year olds in 2001. As long as the characteristics of 
the cohorts do not change in successive cross sections then inferences can be made based on the 
behavior of cohorts. This should not be a concern in a nationally representative survey like the 
SCF since the changes in cohort characteristics reflect changes in the underlying population. In 
this paper I define eight cohorts as follows. The less than 30 cohort contains households where 
the head of the household was less than 30 years old in 1995, less than 33 years old in 1998, and 
less than 36 years old in 2001. The 30 – 34 cohort consists of households where the head was 30 
to 34 years old in 1995, 33 to 37 years old in 1998, and 36 to 39 years old in 2001. The other six 
cohorts are similarly defined in five-year increments based on their age in 1995: 35 – 39, 40 – 
44, 45 – 49, 50 – 54, 55 – 59, and 60 – 6417. 
I have two estimating equations. The first does not account for lifecycle effects while the 
second tracks the savings behavior of cohorts. The jth household’s wealth is estimated as  
j I E I j I E I j
I j I j
E I j j E I j j
W  = ELIGIBLE X X ELIGIBLE
          SCF SCF
          SCF ELIGIBLE SCF ELIGIBLE
( )* * ( )*( * )
* 98 * 01
( )*( 98 * ) ( )( 01 * )
a a a b b b
d g
d d g g e
+ - + + - +
+ +
- + - +
 (1) 
                                                        
16 I thank Dr. Neal Maroney for suggesting the cohort analysis. 
17 Using fewer than five-year increments does not allow enough observations for each of the cohorts. Also, I wanted 
to make sure that a cohort did not span age 59 ½ since the effect of not facing the penalty on early withdrawals may 
affect asset accumulation around this age. 
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where Wj is a measure of wealth (net financial assets, non-housing net worth, net worth), 
ELIGIBLE is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a household is eligible for a 
401(k) plan and zero otherwise, SCF98 and SCF01 equal one if a household is in the 1998 or 
2001 survey and zero otherwise, and X is a matrix of explanatory variables thought to be related 
to savings behavior. The explanatory variables include demographic variables found in most 
studies of savings behavior such as education, income, marital status, and number of household 
members. Also included are a number of variables thought to be related to saver type. One of the 
problems in studying savings behavior is that there may be selection bias: people who are good 
savers will be attracted to 401(k) plans and will save more, but the savings effect may be 
attributed to the retirement program and not the fact that good savers save more. Fortunately, 
the SCF asks a number of questions to help identify saver type. These variables include the 
primary reasons for savings (i.e. retirement, emergencies, education), length of savings horizon, 
whether a household has an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), bequest motives, and 
tolerance for risk. I discuss the demographic and saver type variables in greater detail in the 
following section that discusses recent trends in retirement savings behavior. This estimation is 
similar to Pence’s except that 1) I use the 2001 survey in addition to the 1995 and 1998 surveys 
and 2) I include an X * Eligibility matrix of explanatory variables, where Pence does not18.  
For the savings effect within cohorts I estimate 
j I E I j I E I j
I k j k I k I k j k j
k k
I k j k j I k j k j
k k
E k I k j k j j
k
W  = ELIGIBLE B X B B X ELIGIBLE
         C C ELIGIBLE
         C SCF C SCF
         C SCF ELIGIBLE
8 8
, , , , ,
2 2
8 8
, , , ,
1 1
, , ,
( ) ( ) *
* ( ) * *
* * 98 * 01
( ) * * 98 *
a a a
f f f
d g
d d
= =
= =
+ - + + - +
+ - +
+ +
- +
å å
å å
E k I k j k j j
k
         C SCF ELIGIBLE
8
1
8
, , ,
1
( ) * 01 *g g e
=
=
- +
å
å
  (2) 
                                                        
18 It seems that Pence implicitly assumes these coefficients are equal to zero although they may be important in 
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where Wi, ELIGIBLE, SCF98, SCF01, and X are defined as for (1) and Ck indicates equals one if 
the head of the household is in the kth cohort and zero otherwise. The key coefficients in (1) and 
(2) are E I( )d d- and E I( )g g- , which indicate the extent to which eligible households’ wealth 
accumulation differs from ineligibles. If eligibles are saving more than ineligibles then both 
coefficients should be positive with E I( )g g-  greater than E I( )d d- ; that is, eligible 
households’ wealth would have been increasing from 1995 to 1998 relative to ineligible 
households and the additional contributions suggest that wealth in 2001 would be higher than 
in 1995 and 1998. In (1) E I( )g g-  indicates the wealth accumulation for the entire sample, while 
in (2) the wealth accumulation is within each of the eight cohorts. 
Given the richness of the SCF there are a large number of explanatory variables that 
could be included in the estimation, with many of the variables likely to be highly correlated. 
Using a large number of correlated explanatory variables is likely to lead to parameter estimates 
that are of the wrong sign and / or have large standard errors that may lead to many 
insignificant parameter estimates (see R. Carter Hill and Lee C. Adkins (2001) and Peter 
Kennedy (1998, chapter 11) for a more complete discussion of the effects of using collinear 
explanatory variables). In an effort to avoid including too many collinear variables and to ensure 
a parsimonious model specification I use a testing down (also known as general-to-specific) 
methodology advocated by Kennedy (1998, chapter 5) or David F. Hendry (1993). I begin with a 
general model that includes a large number of explanatory variables then eliminate the variable 
with the least statistical significance from this general model; this model is tested against the 
general model. If this more specific model is not rejected as being different from the general 
model the next least significant variable is eliminated and this model is tested against the 
general model. The process of eliminating variables continues until a model is significantly 
different from the general model; this specific model is then used for the analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
explaining eligible households’ asset accumulation. 
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As noted previously and discussed in greater detail in Angus Deaton (1997), wealth data 
is very skewed. Out of concern for this potential source of heteroskedasticity ordinary least 
squares regressions have not been considered appropriate by researchers examining the savings 
impact of retirement plans. Instead robust estimation techniques may be more appropriate 
when the underlying assumptions of the classical regression do not hold—homoskedastic errors, 
most importantly in this case. In addition, when data is not normally distributed the mean may 
not be the best measure of central tendency as it can be very sensitive to outliers. As the median 
is less sensitive to outliers most research on the effect of retirement plans uses median 
regression (also called least absolute value (LAV) regression; that is, finding the best fit through 
the median, rather than the mean, of the data.19, 20 
It is also common to transform a variable when it is not normally distributed. As is 
evident from the descriptive statistics to be discussed later, the distribution of wealth among US 
households is highly skewed which can result in a problem of heteroskedastic errors if the 
dependent variable in regressions is a measure of wealth. Taking the natural logarithm of the 
dependent variable—a common procedure for dealing with heteroskedasticity—is not desirable 
if there are many negative observations. In the present case as approximately ten percent of the 
                                                        
19 See David Birkes and Yadolah Dodge (1993) or Anthony Atkinson and Marco Riani (2000) for further discussion 
of robust estimation and analysis.  
20 Median regression is just one of several robust estimation techniques. Peter Huber (1964) introduces the idea of 
M-estimation. Birkes and Dodge (1993) describe M-estimation as taking advantage of least squares regression when 
there are no outliers and median regression when there are. What the three techniques share is that they are 
minimizing some error term function, r(e), where e = yi – (a + bxi). Looking at this function for each of these 
techniques, you can see how M-estimation falls in between least squares and median regressions. Least squares 
minimizes the sum of squared error terms, r(e) = e2, median estimation minimizes the sum of absolute deviations, 
r(e) = |e|, and Huber m-estimation minimizes  
2e                      -k  e  k(e)=
k e k        e < - k  k < e
if
22 | | if or
r
ìï £ £
í
-ïî
 
where k = 1.5* 2sˆ , and 2sˆ = 1.483 * MAD, and MAD is the median of the absolute deviations. The size of the 
error term determines how the error is handled by r(e). M-estimation behaves like least squares for small errors and 
median regression for large errors. The value of k is at the researcher’s discretion; for large values of k the m-
estimate is very close to the least squares estimate. For very small values of k the m-estimate is very close to the 
median regression estimate. Originally, I had planned on using the Huber estimation but I found that the parameter 
estimates generally fall between the OLS and LAV coefficients and add little to the analysis. In addition, the 
interpretation of the estimates is not as clear as OLS (the effect on the conditional mean) and LAV (the effect on the 
conditional median). For comparison, the OLS, Huber, and LAV estimates are presented in table six for the level of 
net financial assets specification; for all other specifications I present and focus on the LAV estimates only. 
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net worth observations are non-positive. An alternative transformation is the inverse hyperbolic 
sine (IHS) transformation described by John B. Burbidge, Lonnie Magee, and A. Leslie Robb 
(1988) and used by Pence (2001), Arthur Kennickell (2000), and Christopher D. Carroll, Karen 
E. Dynan, and Spencer D. Krane (1999) with SCF data. The IHS transformation of a variable, w, 
is 
w w1 2 2ln( ( 1)q q q- + +        (3) 
where q is a scaling parameter. Figure two depicts the distribution of level of net financial assets 
while figure three shows the IHS transformation of net financial assets, which creates an 
approximately normal distribution of the skewed variable. 
 
Figure two: Level of Net Financial Assets 
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Figure three: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation Net Financial Assets  (q =.0000006) 
 
 
I follow Burbridge, Magee, and Robb in conducting a grid search over the concentrated log-
likelihood function for positive values of q  to find its optimal value. In the estimations I use 
both the level and transformed values for the dependent variables. The coefficients of the IHS 
specifications cannot be interpreted as marginal effects so I follow Carroll, Dynan, and Krane 
and report the change in an independent variable, x, on a dependent variable, w, as 
w
1
2 2 2* ( 1)b q + , where b is the coefficient from the IHS specification, q , is the optimal scaling 
parameter, and w is evaluated at its median value.21 The IHS—like the log—transformation also 
helps avoid the problem of higher asset accumulation resulting from higher initial wealth levels 
rather than from contributions. This is a concern in the 401(k) savings literature because as 
table two will indicate eligible households begin with more wealth, so an equal return on assets 
causes eligible households to have more end of period wealth, which might be misattributed to 
401(k) contributions. 
                                                        
21 The optimal theta is very small in my specifications so the marginal value is similar to the actual IHS coefficient. I 
report the marginal value to allow for direct comparison with the levels specification coefficients. 
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Since the distribution of wealth in the US is highly skewed a true random sample of US 
households would include many households with relatively little wealth and would likely have 
little information on the nature of most of the assets held by households. In order to get a good 
feel for asset holdings among US households the SCF over samples wealthy households so that 
there are “too many” wealthy households in the survey relative to the US population. In order to 
make data analysis applicable to the US population the survey data includes a variable for 
weighting the households’ observations so that results are applicable to the US population. 
Analysis that does not weight the observations will have estimates that are not representative of 
the US population. All of the results reported in this paper are weighted so as to be 
representative of the US population. 
A related issue concerns the bootstrapping of standard errors for the regression 
parameter estimates. Bootstrapping involves resampling a data set to create a (large) number of 
datasets with the same number of observations, n, as the original dataset but with observations 
included zero, one, two, or more times with each of the observations from the original dataset 
having a 
1
n chance of being included in each of the resamples.
 22 Since the SCF is not a random 
sample the standard bootstrapping procedure is not applicable. In anticipation of this difficulty 
the SCF includes a file of 999 bootstrap resamples for each of the survey years. The file contains 
a replicate weight and multiplicity factor for each observation that are used to create each of the 
bootstrap resamples. The weights and multiplicity factors are computed for the first implicate 
only. In computing bootstrapped standard errors of parameter estimates, I follow Pence who 
computes the bootstrap standard errors for the first implicate then adjusts this standard error 
for the imputation variance as described in the appendix. I follow Pence in using Moshe 
Buchinsky’s (1995) design matrix bootstrap estimator, using the average of the parameter 
estimates in the bootstrap resamples as the pivotal vector in calculating the variance-covariance 
                                                        
22 Christopher Z. Mooney and Robert D. Duval (1993) is a very readable introduction to bootstrapping. 
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matrix. Finally, all of the dollars values are reported in 2001 dollars, adjusted using the “current 
methods” Consumer Price Index (CPI). This is the series used by Federal Reserve in examining 
the SCF, see Ana M. Aizcorbe, Arthur B. Kennickell, and Kevin B. Moore (2003). 
Trends in retirement savings from 1995 to 2001 
Table two presents the mean and median of the financial variables by eligibility and year. 
Not surprisingly, ineligible households have no 401(k) assets, although the median of retirement 
assets is also $0 for ineligible households. A striking difference between households eligible for 
401(k) plans and those that are ineligible is that the mean and median of every wealth measure 
is greater for eligibles than for ineligibles. These differences between eligibles and ineligibles are 
greater than the differences in 401(k) and retirement assets, suggesting that eligibles are better 
savers than ineligibles. The skewness of the wealth distribution within US households is also 
apparent, as within eligible and ineligible categories the mean is substantially larger than the 
median for all wealth measures. A final point worth noting is that the growth in 401(k) asset 
slowed somewhat from 1998 to 2001 compared the 1995 to 1998 period. The median (mean) 
401(k) balance grew by 157 (60) percent from 1995 to 1998 and by 22 (14) percent from 1998 to 
2001. In general, it's useful to keep in mind that there are a number of reasons for 401(k) growth 
besides contributions. These include increased eligibility, increased participation rates by 
eligibles, and returns on existing assets in these plans. 
Table two: Financial characteristics by eligibility status 
 
 1995  1998  2001 
 Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible 
         
Mean $52,504 $103,965  $65,791 $144,055  $93,408 $167,559 Financial 
Assets Median $5,432 $28,549  $6,126 $40,547  $6,900 $44,000 
Mean $44,149 $93,370  $53,152 $121,121  $84,931 $153,852 Net 
Financial 
Assets Median $925 $19,360  $1,121 $25,906  $1,920 $32,510 
Mean $77,557 $138,048  $92,926 $171,339  $128,668 $212,539 Non-
housing 
Net Worth Median $12,888 $42,592  $11,581 $52,638  $14,680 $57,890 
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 1995  1998  2001 
 Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible 
Mean $113,270 $185,321  $132,907 $221,275  $176,439 $281,829 Net Worth 
Median $32,063 $78,862  $33,242 $91,323  $35,300 $112,700 
Mean $0 $20,943  $0 $33,478  $0 $38,145 401(k) 
assets Median $0 $2,543  $0 $6,531  $0 $8,000 
Mean $16,677 $48,539  $17,057 $55,762  $28,090 $71,030 Retirement 
Assets 
(incl. 
401(k)) 
Median $0 $9,940  $0 $15,239  $0 $18,000 
 
Table three shows recent trends in 401(k) plan eligibility both within categories and 
across time. These statistics confirm eligibility trends found in previously cited literature, such 
as eligibility increasing in both income and education, and among households where the head is 
white. Eligibility rates are quite low for low-income households (i.e. about 30 percent for 
households earning between 10 and 30 thousand dollars versus more than 70 percent for 
earning more than 80 thousand dollars). Eligibility is also increasing in education. Households 
with an undergraduate or graduate degree had eligibility rates more than 10 percentage points 
higher than households that did not finish college. Among the variables that help identify saver 
type, eligibility follows an expected pattern. Good savers, such as households that also have 
defined benefit pension coverage, indicate that retirement is their primary reason for saving, or 
have savings horizons greater than 10 years have higher eligibility rates than those that don’t. 
It’s interesting to note that while eligibility rates are increasing in savings horizon the gap in 
eligibility between short term and long term savers has narrowed considerably since 1995 
(decreasing from 27 to 11 percent). This is encouraging because if savings horizon reflects 
willingness to save for the future then the message about individuals needing to save more for 
retirement may be sinking in. Eligibility rates are highest for workers in manufacturing 
industries (perhaps reflecting labor union concentration) and in finance, insurance, real estate, 
and repair services (perhaps reflecting the more professional nature of these occupations or the 
Table two continued 
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necessity of having a college degree). Eligibility is lowest among agriculture and mining and 
construction workers, with agriculture workers showing a marked increase in eligibility from 19 
percent in 1995 to 34 percent in 2001. 
Table three: Eligibility status for selected sample characteristics 
 
 1995 SCF  1998 SCF  2001 SCF 
Income: < $10k 8.79%  22.93%  9.53% 
Income: $10k - $30k 26.02%  34.23%  31.76% 
Income: 30k – 50k 47.29%  53.35%  54.67% 
Income: 50k – 80k 56.91%  64.11%  66.43% 
Income: 80k – 150k 64.32%  74.13%  77.26% 
Income: > 150k 76.79%  69.69%  77.47% 
      
Finished high school 44.19%  52.33%  56.83% 
Some college 45.72%  57.91%  54.97% 
Finished college 56.51%  61.64%  67.77% 
Graduate school 54.55%  60.50%  70.58% 
      
Cohort < 30 41.62%  50.24%  55.98% 
Cohort 30 - 34 48.04%  56.33%  61.28% 
Cohort 35 – 39 49.05%  59.23%  62.96% 
Cohort 40 – 44 50.79%  56.81%  60.30% 
Cohort 45 – 49 51.09%  51.59%  60.10% 
Cohort 50 – 54 47.33%  57.39%  52.07% 
Cohort 55 – 59 39.93%  55.28%  45.71% 
Cohort 60 – 64 29.34%  39.90%  29.72% 
      
Married 52.64%  58.95%  63.35% 
Not Married 37.51%  48.19%  50.36% 
Both head and spouse work 58.45%  67.68%  71.58% 
Only head of household works 37.76%  45.40%  47.32% 
Head of household is not white 37.39%  41.29%  48.69% 
Head of household is white 49.14%  58.62%  60.87% 
      
Household also has defined benefit plan 59.08%  67.25%  66.23% 
Household does not have defined benefit plan 41.47%  50.05%  54.76% 
Child’s education is main reason for saving 52.36%  50.53%  61.92% 
Retirement is main reason for saving 57.56%  65.77%  65.82% 
Precautionary motive is main reason for saving 43.46%  48.86%  50.18% 
Does not anticipate major expense in next 5 to 
10 years 42.60%  51.15%  53.70% 
Sees child’s education as a major expense 54.32%  58.11%  63.31% 
See bad health as a major expense 36.97%  43.32%  38.22% 
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 1995 SCF  1998 SCF  2001 SCF 
      
Savings horizon less than one year 30.85%  45.11%  52.88% 
Savings horizon 1 to 10 years 47.98%  54.14%  56.73% 
Savings horizon greater than 10 years 57.86%  64.80%  64.47% 
      
Expects to receive a bequest 52.95%  62.08%  68.18% 
Does not expect to receive a bequest 44.89%  52.92%  56.00% 
Leaving a bequest is very important 45.74%  50.48%  58.13% 
Leaving a bequest is somewhat important 45.84%  55.43%  59.27% 
Leaving a bequest is not important 44.89%  52.92%  56.00% 
Willing to take substantial investment risk 44.90%  65.47%  64.64% 
Willing to take above average investment risk 58.29%  67.56%  69.04% 
Willing to take average investment risk 52.91%  56.20%  63.91% 
Not willing to take any investment risk 33.77%  40.17%  42.40% 
Expects economy to perform worse in the next 
five years 38.96%  52.99%  59.36% 
Does not expect economy to perform worse in 
the next five years 48.47%  54.83%  56.95% 
      
Industry: Agriculture 19.73%  27.54%  34.00% 
Industry: Mining and construction 43.85%  43.50%  42.94% 
Industry: Manufacturing 58.51%  63.20%  70.67% 
Industry: Wholesale and retail trade 38.40%  45.27%  51.09% 
Industry: Finance, insurance, real estate, 
repair services 
50.24%  57.25%  60.58% 
Industry: Transportation, communication, 
utilities, entertainment 42.11%  54.99%  56.18% 
Industry: Public administration, military 46.45%  50.80%  55.04% 
 
Across time, eligibility increased for most variables from 1995 to 1998, with the increase 
quite large among households earning less than $150,000, those having some college education, 
the youngest and oldest cohorts, and unmarried households. This is consistent with Pence’s 
discussion of eligibility trends in the 1990’s. Not as many variables showed increases in 
eligibility from 1998 to 2001 as they did from 1995 to 1998. In addition, where there are 
increases, they are generally not as large as from 1998 to 2001. For example, eligibility increased 
by six to nine percentage points for households earning between $30,000 and $150,000 from 
1995 to 1998, but only by one to three percentage points from 1998 to 2001. A possible 
explanation is that the soft economy beginning in 2000 may have led some firms to save 
Table three, continued 
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resources by scaling back retirement benefits. It’s also possible that eligibility rates have been 
slowing because they have been approaching some natural limit, especially in the absence of 
government mandated employer provided pension coverage. The consistent differences between 
eligible and ineligible households when looking at saver type and the measures of wealth 
(whether for the entire sample in tables two and three or by cohorts in table four) suggests the 
importance of controlling for saver type that the SCF—but few other datasets—affords. 
Among cohorts, eligibility increases with the three youngest cohorts (the less than 30, 30 
– 34, and 35 – 39 year olds), is steady for the next two, then decreases for the older than 50 
cohorts. Older workers likely began their careers before 401(k) plans became widespread 
through the 1990s and some of them may not have been grand fathered into the plan at the 
place of employment. It is encouraging to see in figure four that for the three youngest cohorts 
(until age 40) eligibility increases both in these cohorts and from 1995 to 2001. Eligibility 
remains steady for the 40- and 45-year-old cohorts then declines for the older cohorts. 
Figure four: Cohort eligibility by SCF survey year 
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Cohort < 30 Cohort 30 - 34 Cohort 35 – 39 Cohort 40 – 44 Cohort 45 – 49 Cohort 50 – 54 Cohort 55 – 59 Cohort 60 – 64
1995 1998 2001
 
Table four contains cross tabulations of eligibility with income and education. With the 
exception of the groups that earn less than $10,000 or more than $150,000, eligibility appears 
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to remain steady or increase slightly for the four youngest cohorts and generally declines for the 
oldest two or three cohorts. The younger cohorts in the income group earning more than 
$150,000 have the highest eligibility rates (over 90 percent for the less than 30 cohort), while 
the lowest eligibility rates are found in the lowest (less than $10,000) income group. The 
education cross tabulations show those with at least a college degree (bachelor’s or graduate) 
have higher eligibility rates than those without a college degree, with eligibility generally lower 
for the older cohorts.  
Table four: Descriptive statistics within cohorts 
 
 Percentage eligible for 401(k) plan 
 Cohort  1995 1998 2001 
< 30  7.71% 25.39% 9.40% 
30 – 34  20.24% 42.88% 28.07% 
35 – 39  7.27% 6.30% 0% 
40 – 44  2.95% 6.40% 15.06% 
45 – 49  0% 18.79% 0% 
50 – 54  0% 0% 0% 
55 – 59  0% 0% 0% 
Income: 
< 10K 
60 – 64  0% 0% 0% 
      
< 30  26.97% 29.97% 28.24% 
30 – 34  34.38% 35.94% 30.19% 
35 – 39  28.84% 31.36% 33.03% 
40 – 44  24.31% 38.91% 36.95% 
45 – 49  16.75% 36.05% 35.15% 
50 – 54  19.99% 42.80% 36.61% 
55 – 59  23.01% 47.64% 33.16% 
Income: 
10k – 30k 
60 – 64  18.32% 21.76% 28.50% 
      
< 30  46.58% 59.59% 55.08% 
30 – 34  47.42% 54.43% 59.64% 
35 – 39  47.33% 56.55% 59.83% 
40 – 44  56.08% 45.21% 57.51% 
45 – 49  47.96% 44.00% 50.12% 
50 – 54  39.95% 56.47% 49.42% 
55 – 59  42.09% 66.55% 43.89% 
Income: 30k – 50k 
60 – 64  39.22% 23.33% 22.29% 
      
< 30  66.34% 65.47% 71.33% 
30 – 34  61.70% 65.45% 74.85% 
35 – 39  57.28% 70.14% 74.29% 
40 – 44  54.84% 64.69% 65.05% 
45 – 49  63.70% 52.77% 51.10% 
Income: 50k – 80k 
50 – 54  70.42% 68.64% 58.95% 
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 Percentage eligible for 401(k) plan 
 Cohort  1995 1998 2001 
55 – 59  31.45% 50.60% 53.75%  
60 – 64  32.29% 66.01% 18.18% 
< 30  79.76% 78.88% 81.94% 
30 – 34  70.27% 81.19% 81.27% 
35 – 39  65.08% 80.20% 77.57% 
40 – 44  72.99% 74.43% 78.30% 
45 – 49  59.89% 71.96% 82.82% 
50 – 54  64.28% 62.26% 63.16% 
55 – 59  59.41% 63.32% 49.59% 
Income: 80k – 
150k 
60 – 64  18.30% 62.00% 55.83% 
 
      
< 30  94.72% 96.66% 97.31% 
30 – 34  86.01% 81.35% 79.79% 
35 – 39  77.93% 82.93% 75.84% 
40 – 44  84.04% 67.59% 65.33% 
45 – 49  88.69% 47.55% 82.04% 
50 – 54  58.90% 52.37% 60.12% 
55 – 59  65.76% 62.21% 90.06% 
Income: > 150k 
60 – 64  71.05% 78.34% 45.72% 
      
< 30  41.70% 47.31% 55.27% 
30 – 34  47.33% 59.70% 61.30% 
35 – 39  52.12% 51.89% 59.88% 
40 – 44  37.07% 54.89% 55.62% 
45 – 49  54.49% 48.13% 61.71% 
50 – 54  50.78% 55.68% 52.70% 
55 – 59  39.35% 58.69% 42.47% 
Education: 
Finished High 
School 
60 – 64  18.43% 30.78% 45.71% 
      
< 30  33.36% 51.73% 50.19% 
30 – 34  46.76% 55.57% 58.85% 
35 – 39  47.61% 66.72% 61.41% 
40 – 44  58.69% 60.25% 59.43% 
45 – 49  43.43% 60.08% 53.11% 
50 – 54  60.17% 61.80% 51.04% 
55 – 59  29.62% 54.23% 52.91% 
Education: 
Some College 
60 – 64  41.97% 36.27% 26.24% 
      
< 30  54.12% 60.78% 68.43% 
30 – 34  58.66% 58.28% 74.14% 
35 – 39  51.33% 64.16% 76.46% 
40 – 44  62.46% 63.77% 66.64% 
45 – 49  57.25% 57.63% 60.56% 
50 – 54  61.06% 77.89% 55.41% 
55 – 59  50.72% 54.32% 60.85% 
Education: 
Finished College 
60 – 64  47.90% 57.55% 14.27% 
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   Percentage eligible for 401(k) plan 
 Cohort  1995 1998 2001 
< 30  54.34% 57.25% 73.29% 
30 – 34  49.92% 67.96% 76.92% 
35 – 39  68.52% 81.33% 61.36% 
40 – 44  67.54% 60.33% 71.09% 
45 – 49  56.69% 55.50% 73.84% 
50 – 54  40.30% 46.13% 85.48% 
55 – 59  40.95% 40.96% 39.22% 
Education: 
Graduate School 
60 – 64  22.68% 76.81% 40.26% 
 
Table five: Means and medians of selected financial variables within cohorts 
 
  1995  1998  2001 
  Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible 
$28,070 $47,395  $19,920 $71,686  $71,736 $114,507 Cohort 
< 30 ($6,866) ($21,787)  ($4,572) ($25,949)  ($9,850) ($52,990) 
$42,192 $69,329  $64,784 $157,426  $72,348 $165,962 Cohort 
30 - 
34 ($13,801) ($49,701)  ($15,783) ($66,854)  ($19,740) ($91,300) 
$67,500 $133,420  $110,973 $203,598  $160,241 $224,299 Cohort 
35 – 
39 ($25,509) ($78,828)  ($37,443) ($91,671)  ($47,100) ($121,190) 
$90,126 $189,289  $140,961 $241,753  $179,565 $305,376 Cohort 
40 – 
44 ($48,845) ($78,516)  ($54,315) ($127,569)  ($72,100) ($124,530) 
$143,520 $282,412  $243,165 $296,488  $332,652 $559,638 Cohort 
45 – 
49 ($65,073) ($141,555)  ($92,694) ($154,029)  ($110,290) ($206,130) 
$225,733 $361,797  $277,669 $368,374  $386,832 $515,036 Cohort 
50 – 
54 ($77,568) ($208,108)  ($90,713) ($144,658)  ($99,100) ($211,630) 
$265,440 $341,189  $245,934 $398,217  $240,918 $660,835 Cohort 
55 – 
59 ($109,296) ($118,681)  ($199,538) ($193,258)  ($91,240) ($290,950) 
$294,559 $441,438  $293,659 $565,063  $318,511 $719,470 
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Cohort 
60 – 
64 ($129,684) ($230,300)  ($86,566) ($199,876)  ($120,600) ($139,000) 
           
$3,256 $18,665  -$294 $27,876  $23,775 $50,693 Cohort 
< 30 -($358) ($2,312)  -($1,415) ($2,721)  ($0) ($8,400) 
$14,984 $30,193  $28,054 $71,374  $18,725 $76,767 Cohort 
30 - 
34 -($116) ($11,188)  ($44) ($16,120)  ($0) ($30,500) 
$21,672 $50,319  $48,710 $101,077  $64,460 $109,284 Cohort 
35 – 
39 ($1,618) ($8,911)  ($2,318) ($34,287)  ($1,220) ($36,700) M
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n
 (
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ed
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of
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Cohort $28,099 $92,332  $51,734 $130,949  $88,330 $176,921 
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  1995  1998  2001 
  Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible  Ineligible Eligible 
40 – 
44 ($1,804) ($27,508)  ($2,395) ($40,468)  ($11,190) ($37,120) 
$48,907 $154,097  $99,594 $171,471  $198,519 $317,195 Cohort 
45 – 
49 ($3,132) ($35,484)  ($14,422) ($70,206)  ($20,500) ($94,280) 
$92,394 $204,267  $107,845 $222,553  $208,491 $306,173 Cohort 
50 – 
54 ($8,380) ($75,014)  ($14,150) ($52,791)  ($9,600) ($100,500) 
$113,418 $170,955  $113,260 $241,152  $138,390 $435,870 Cohort 
55 – 
59 ($11,789) ($35,334)  ($57,275) ($76,628)  ($28,100) ($143,200) 
$162,559 $254,486  $137,276 $401,334  $144,932 $416,246 
 
Cohort 
60 – 
64 ($20,343) ($78,134)  ($12,104) ($93,608)  ($14,150) ($114,000) 
          
$2,681 $11,499  $1,533 $15,424  $4,330 $22,964 Cohort 
< 30 ($0) ($1,849)  ($0) ($3,810)  ($0) ($7,000) 
$9,169 $19,877  $6,937 $36,142  $8,282 $43,970 Cohort 
30 - 
34 ($0) ($5,779)  ($0) ($10,885)  ($0) ($17,200) 
$10,983 $26,924  $19,123 $48,006  $20,565 $67,279 Cohort 
35 – 
39 ($0) ($6,935)  ($0) ($19,048)  ($0) ($28,500) 
$13,323 $45,565  $13,441 $60,796  $34,865 $69,142 Cohort 
40 – 
44 ($0) ($15,604)  ($0) ($27,212)  ($0) ($18,700) 
$23,637 $83,248  $21,772 $79,263  $63,115 $129,029 Cohort 
45 – 
49 ($0) ($23,117)  ($0) ($27,212)  ($30) ($60,000) 
$36,141 $99,103  $35,257 $99,896  $47,289 $132,669 Cohort 
50 – 
54 ($0) ($29,011)  ($0) ($32,001)  ($0) ($45,000) 
$33,172 $94,148  $48,832 $123,186  $68,858 $189,501 Cohort 
55 – 
59 ($0) ($21,961)  ($9,796) ($41,362)  ($0) ($46,000) 
$37,321 $107,578  $52,454 $109,572  $64,022 $224,660 M
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Cohort 
60 – 
64 ($0) ($57,792)  ($0) ($40,273)  ($0) ($7,700) 
 
Results for Estimation of Full Sample (Without Cohort Effects) 
Tables six and seven present the results of equation (1). Table six presents the results for 
the OLS, Huber M-, and LAV regressions for the level of net financial assets specification and 
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LAV regression for the IHS specification of net financial assets23, while table seven contain the 
results of the LAV estimations for the level and IHS transform of non-housing net worth and net 
worth including housing equity. There are several general results worth noting: the coefficients 
are generally of the expected signs and magnitudes, the coefficients are larger as the wealth 
measure become broader, in addition to the saver type variables some of the explanatory * 
eligibility are important in explaining wealth levels, and once life-cycle effects are accounted for 
in the cohort analysis the savings effect attributable to 401(k) plans is negligible.  
Table six: Comparison of estimation methods for net financial assets specification 
 
 Ordinary Least Squares  Huber M-Estimation  Least Absolute Values 
 Levels  Levels  Levels  IHS Transformation 
 Coeff StandardError T-stat 
 Coeff Standard Error T-stat
 Coeff Standard Error T-stat  
Marginal 
Effect T-stat 
Intercept -11,606 9,872 -1.18  -1,078 1,403 -0.77  -136 534 -0.25  235 1.15 
Eligibility -27,610 15,255 -1.81  -7,084 2,106 -3.36  -3,433 1,178 -2.91  -29 -0.07 
1998 SCF -1,749 7,957 -0.22  1,116 1,350 0.83  884 382 2.31  410 2.76 
2001 SCF 23,109 10,435 2.21  4,256 1,569 2.71  782 414 1.89  517 2.46 
Eligibility * 1998 SCF 43,225 13,603 3.18  9,677 2,125 4.55  3,471 1,200 2.89  1,153 3.94 
Eligibility * 2001 SCF 4,884 16,655 0.29  279 2,592 0.11  -451 1,606 -0.28  -313 -0.78 
Income: $50k - $80k 26,594 6,138 4.33  14,553 1,459 9.97  8,879 1,236 7.18  4,812 16.89 
Income: $80k - $150k 107,307 11,940 8.99  60,434 3,781 15.98  58,756 5,695 10.32  10,441 32.58 
Income: > $150k 1,007,071 153,093 6.58  416,869 58,839 7.08  418,093 51,942 8.05  29,844 23.79 
Education: 
Graduate school 43,663 16,860 2.59 
 15,779 3,295 4.79  11,261 3,429 3.28  1,843 3.97 
Married 44,221 9,182 4.82  7,703 1,399 5.51  1,498 483 3.1  756 4.57 
Both head and 
spouse work -38,022 11,738 -3.24 
 -9,162 1,569 -5.84  -4,923 1,079 -4.56  -1,220 -3.99 
Number of household 
members -10,177 2,171 -4.69 
 -2,179 385 -5.67  -586 177 -3.32  -380 -6.90 
Has a defined benefit 
plan -31,549 9,150 -3.45 
 -1,418 1,355 -1.05  -950 892 -1.07  -23 -0.12 
Has an IRA 117,939 8,748 13.48  51,574 2,024 25.48  48,973 2,632 18.61  9,657 41.54 
Has other account 
Type pension plan 29,070 15,809 1.84 
 18,142 2,956 6.14  8,442 1,832 4.61  5,277 10 
Leaving a bequest 
is very important 25,834 10,995 2.35 
 -849 1,459 -0.58  145 318 0.46  184 0.8 
Place of employment 27,183 7,812 3.48  3,481 1,297 2.68  256 494 0.52  354 2.17 
                                                        
23 Since I report the marginal effect of the IHS transformation I omit the standard errors of this specification; the T-
stats are based on the coefficient divided by the standard error. 
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 Ordinary Least Squares  Huber M-Estimation  Least Absolute Values 
 Levels  Levels  Levels  IHS Transformation 
 Coeff StandardError T-stat 
 Coeff Standard Error T-stat
 Coeff Standard Error T-stat  
Marginal 
Effect T-stat 
has greater than 
500 employees 
              
Eligibility * 
Income: $80k - $150k  -240,489 179,922 -1.34 
 -81,370 65,910 -1.23  -85,073 59,942 -1.42  -7,618 -5.27 
Eligibility * 
Age 45 – 55 in 1995 40,983 12,593 3.25 
 18,940 2,328 8.14  14,039 2,229 6.3  3,075 9.83 
Eligibility * 
Both head and spouse work -77,665 15,993 -4.86 
 -16,401 2,479 -6.62  -9,040 1,644 -5.5  -3,190 -7.6 
Eligibility * 
Has other account type 
pension plan 
60,107 24,702 2.43  11,413 4,693 2.43  13,841 2,969 4.66  -894 -1.17 
Eligibility * 
Owns home 31,386 9,045 3.47 
 12,442 1,820 6.84  6,784 1,280 5.3  3,522 12.59 
Eligibility * 
Reason for saving: 
retirement 
29,619 11,357 2.61  17,309 2,696 6.42  13,716 2,007 6.83  2,627 8.41 
Eligibility * 
Leaving a bequest 
is very important 
27,968 18,154 1.54  6,979 2,348 2.97  2,726 1,299 2.1  1,155 3.14 
 
The skewness of wealth data is apparent, as the coefficients in table six are much larger 
for the OLS regressions than the LAV coefficients, while the Huber estimates are generally 
between the two. This also reflects that the nature of the estimation techniques as the predicted 
values in OLS estimations are conditional means while the predicted values in LAV estimations 
are conditional medians, with the Huber coefficients generally between the two. Also note that 
tables six and seven are the final estimations from the testing down methodology and indicate 
that a number of demographic * eligibility variables are important in explaining the amount of 
wealth that households have. This is a difference with Pence’s work, which implicitly assumes 
that the coefficients on the demographic * eligibility variables are equal to zero. The final 
estimations also demonstrate the importance of including variables that proxy for saver type. 
While a number of saver type variables were included in the initial model, the most important of 
these appear to be those indicating whether a household has another type of retirement 
program, such as a defined benefit plan, another account type plan, or an IRA. Having an IRA is 
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an important proxy for saver type because, unlike employer specific pension coverage, IRA 
accounts are available to any non-self-employed individual who has positive income.  For the 
three wealth measures the coefficient on Has IRA is around five times larger than the 
coefficients on the “has other pension” variable. Specifically, having an IRA raises median net 
financial assets by $48,973, non-housing net worth by $61,900, and total net worth by $83,669.  
 
Table seven: Median regression results of effect of 401(k) plan eligibility for full sample of 
households 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is non-housing net worth 
 
 Levels Specification  IHS transform  
 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat  Marginal Effect T-stat 
Intercept 4,554 625 7.29  5,832 16.94 
Eligibility -2,671 1,565 -1.71  2,432 4.62 
1998 SCF 473 485 0.97  -328 -0.81 
2001 SCF 807 691 1.17  -37 -0.08 
Eligibility * 1998 SCF 8,201 1,982 4.14  2,458 3.60 
Eligibility * 2001 SCF 1,963 1,886 1.04  332 0.52 
       
Has a defined benefit plan 1,263 1,200 1.05  971 2.19 
Has an IRA 61,900 2,741 22.58  12,765 21.02 
Has other account type pension plan 16,313 1,937 8.42  7,879 12.89 
Income: $50k - $80k 18,052 1,594 11.33  8,487 19.62 
Income: $80k - $150k 83,477 4,730 17.65  15,854 36.92 
Income: > $150k 699,511 77,587 9.02  53,220 17.80 
Eligibility * Income: $80k - $150k -176,567 83,536 -2.11  -15,332 -4.33 
Married 4,015 626 6.41  3,517 13.67 
Number of household members -1,262 199 -6.35  -938 -11.26 
Leaving a bequest is very important 209 640 0.33  820 2.85 
Education: Graduate school 14,987 3,745 4.00  2,511 4.46 
Eligibility * Has other account type pension plan 9,706 3,811 2.55  -2,743 -3.01 
Eligibility * Owns home 15,314 1,783 8.59  5,346 13.51 
Eligibility * Age 45 – 55 in 1995 16,696 2,451 6.81  3,620 6.44 
       
Eligibility * Married 5,948 2,108 2.82  42 0.09 
Eligibility * Both head and spouse work -18,002 2,167 -8.31  -5,562 -13.10 
Anticipates receiving a substantial bequest 6,891 1,652 4.17  2,028 4.71 
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Table seven, continued 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is net worth 
 
 Levels Specification  IHS transform  
 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat  Marginal Effect T-stat 
Intercept 2,724 1,288 2.12  4,976 33.85 
Eligibility -4,911 2,193 -2.24  1,495 9.81 
1998 SCF -330 868 -0.38  -777 -4.14 
2001 SCF 551 939 0.59  -318 -1.56 
Eligibility * 1998 SCF 9,993 2,550 3.92  832 2.81 
Eligibility * 2001 SCF 4,620 2,789 1.66  49 0.15 
       
Has a defined benefit plan 6,765 2,063 3.28  541 4.29 
Has an IRA 83,669 4,615 18.13  3,775 29.46 
Income: $50k - $80k 29,704 4,125 7.20  2,640 15.61 
Income: $80k - $150k 126,569 6,342 19.96  4,845 17.57 
Income: > $150k 873,598 115,765 7.55  20,702 9.78 
Eligibility * Income: $80k - $150k -195,664 115,906 -1.69  -6,215 -2.68 
Married 4,134 1,078 3.84  1,249 8.01 
Number of household members -1,173 377 -3.11  -427 -11.54 
Leaving a bequest is very important 940 904 1.04  259 2.76 
Education: Graduate school 14,091 4,483 3.14  1,097 3.58 
Eligibility * Has other account type pension plan 26,159 4,212 6.21  1,453 5.68 
Eligibility * Age 45 – 55 in 1995 36,484 3,903 9.35  1,534 8.20 
Eligibility * Married 14,187 3,445 4.12  -408 -1.60 
Eligibility * Both head and spouse work -31,213 3,761 -8.30  -2,318 -9.19 
Owns home 50,701 2,538 19.98  7,113 45.99 
Anticipates receiving a substantial bequest 7,005 1,950 3.59  639 4.33 
Both head and spouse work -4,128 1,479 -2.79  269 1.82 
 
The income group variables are, as expected, positive and increasing in income. The very 
large coefficient for the over $150,000 income group reflects that very wealthy households also 
have high incomes and that households with high incomes are able to accumulate large amounts 
of assets over the life cycle. In the regressions that account for cohort effects and those that 
exclude households with over $1,000,000 of net worth (which I’ll discuss later in the paper) the 
coefficient is still is larger than the $80k - $150k income group, but not nearly as large as in this 
first regression. I don’t have a good explanation as to why the Eligible * Income Greater than 
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$150k coefficient is negative. In fact, in the general regressions that include all of the potential 
explanatory variables all of the Eligibility * Income Group coefficients are negative and 
decreasing (that is, getting more negative) in income groups. One plausible explanation is that—
within a particular income group—perhaps households with a 401(k) plan feel the need to have 
less wealth at particular point in time than ineligible households in anticipation of faster wealth 
accumulation in the future because of the retirement plan. Interestingly, the both head of 
household and spouse work and eligibility * both head of household and spouse work 
coefficients are negatively related to wealth holdings. Households that have two earners almost 
certainly face less income risk than one-earner households and so may need less buffer stock 
savings to guard against job loss. Also consistent is the explanation suggested above for the 
negative coefficients on the eligibility * income group variables, although the buffer stock 
explanation strikes me as more plausible. 
The savings effects of 401(k) plans is found in the Eligibility * SCF98 and Eligibility * 
SCF01 coefficients. These coefficients indicate the additional wealth accumulated from 1995 to 
1998 and from 1995 to 2001 that can be attributed to the retirement savings programs. The 
coefficients for the three dependent variables are positive, significant, and increasing in broader 
wealth measures for 1995 to 1998; for the 1995 to 2001 period the coefficient is negative and 
insignificant for the net financial assets specification and positive and insignificant for the non-
housing net worth and net worth specifications. 401(k) eligibility accounts for $3,471 of net 
financial assets, $8,201 of non-housing net worth, and $9,993 of additional net worth in 1998 
compared to 1995. At first this suggests that there was a savings effect over this period. The IHS 
specification, which reports the marginal effect evaluated at the median of the dependent 
variable, is also positive and significant over this period, though the effect is much less than for 
the levels specification ($1,153, $2,458, and $832 for net financial assets, non-housing net 
worth, and net worth) meaning that much of the increase in the wealth measures is attributable 
to asset returns rather than contributions to the plans. Interestingly, while the levels of net 
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worth coefficient is larger than the non-housing net worth coefficient the IHS marginal effect is 
not. This supports prior research (Engen and Gale (2001), Pence (2001), and Benjamin (2003)) 
that suggests that at least part of 401(k) savings are a result of substitution from home equity. 
Another point worth emphasizing is that although the eligibility * SCF98 is statistically positive 
and significant for the three wealth measures their economic significance is quite small, 
especially compared to the observed factors, in particular the wealth attributable to IRA 
accounts, and other account type pension plans (for net financial assets and non-housing net 
worth). The effect is also small relative to the contribution limits of 401(k) plans, which were 
$10,000 per year for much of the time. 
While there is some evidence that 401(k) plans resulted in increased savings from 1995 
to 1998 the coefficients for the eligibility * SCF01 are not consistent with a savings effect. For 
both the levels and IHS specifications the coefficients are insignificantly different from zero and 
they are also less than the eligibility * SCF98 coefficients, which indicates that asset 
accumulation attributable to 401(k) eligibility was less from 1995 to 2001 than from 1995 to 
1998. The downturn in the economy beginning in 200o is likely an important reason. Consider 
that the average closing price from May to October24 for the Dow Jones Industrial Average was 
85 percent higher in 1998 than in 1995, 119 percent higher in 2001 compared to 1995, and 19 
percent higher in 2001 compared to 1998.While the Dow Jones was higher in 2001 than 1998, 
there were no gains after April 1999. Given that much of the enthusiasm for 401(k) plans in the 
1990s was associated with the bull market, households may have found themselves less willing 
to contribute to their 401(k) plans once the market stopped reaching new heights. In addition, if 
the economic downturn caused households to shift assets to precautionary accounts then saving 
an equal amount of pre-tax income in a regular savings account versus a tax-advantaged account 
means that there would be less in contributions to the non tax-advantaged account. Finally, part 
of the reason for the positive coefficient for 1995 to 1998 period may be because of increased 
                                                        
24 The SCF interviews are generally conducted from May to October of the year in question. 
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401(k) eligibility and participation. The savings of new participants will be new savings, 
assuming that they do not immediately reshuffle their assets. Also, it’s easy to suppose that 
newly participating households may be enthusiastic about the program and save more than 
households that have been participating for a length of time; consequently the increase in wealth 
would not be as large for the 1998 to 2001 group that contains fewer new participants. 
Results Within Lower Wealth Households 
A concern with the results is that the increases in asset accumulation may be a result of 
saving by wealthy households. Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes 
(2004) indicate that wealthy households do indeed have higher propensities to save. While it is 
important for all households to save, a major policy concern is that less wealthy households 
adequately save for retirement. When households are inadequately prepared for retirement then 
the burden may fall to the government to provide income in old age. To address this concern, 
table eight reports the LAV estimations for households that have net worth of less than 
$1,000,000 (I sometimes refer to these as low wealth households). As might be expected the 
coefficients are not as large for this group compared to the sample that includes high wealth 
households. The effect on the greater than $150,000 income group, mentioned earlier, is most 
striking. Other noticeable differences include the effect of having an IRA, which is about ten to 
fifteen thousand dollars less than the higher wealth group; I was expecting that this difference 
might be larger. The effect of having another account type pension plan on net financial assets is 
larger for the group that excludes wealthy households (11,913 vs. 8,442) though the effect is 
similar for non-housing net worth. It is interesting to note that the testing down methodology 
includes some variables in the low wealth specification that are not significant in the group that 
includes households with more than one million dollars of net worth. For example, eligible 
households that have retirement as their primary savings motive is an important determination 
of wealth for this low wealth group; these households have $9,303 more of net financial assets, 
$17,545 of non-housing net worth, and $18,518 of net worth compared to households with 
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households that report a different primary savings motive. Length of savings horizon is also 
important for these lower wealth households. Although none of these saver type coefficients is as 
large as the IRA coefficient which suggests that controlling for IRA status is perhaps a very 
important proxy for saver type.25 
 
Table eight: Effect of 401(k) eligibility for sample of households with less than $1,000,000 of 
net worth 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is net financial assets 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat  Marginal Effect T-stat 
Intercept -4,822 980 -4.92  -2,117 -5.50 
Eligibility -3,995 1,887 -2.12  810 1.80 
1998 SCF 1,112 474 2.35  565 3.71 
2001 SCF 316 586 0.54  18 0.07 
Eligibility * 1998 SCF 1,882 1,367 1.38  813 2.95 
Eligibility * 2001 SCF -219 2,147 -0.10  476 1.02 
Income: $50k - $80k 6,936 1,152 6.02  4,505 16.53 
Income: $80k - $150k 49,877 5,853 8.52  9,299 25.55 
Income: > $150k 147,664 12,264 12.04  15,055 23.35 
Age: 45 – 55 in 1995 2,276 646 3.52  1,493 5.99 
Education: Graduate school 9,134 2,294 3.98  1,950 5.54 
Married 848 515 1.65  547 2.63 
Both head and spouse work -3,969 955 -4.16  -1,079 -3.23 
Number of household members -184 181 -1.02  -290 -5.58 
Has an IRA 39,230 2,381 16.48  8,533 37.65 
Has other account type pension plan 11,913 1,830 6.51  4,621 17.02 
Retirement is main reason for saving 1,386 680 2.04  1,739 5.54 
Does not anticipate major expense 
in next 5 to 10 years 2,074 526 3.94  1,056 5.11 
Savings horizon between 1 and 10 years 1,765 501 3.52  1,235 6.06 
Savings horizon greater than 10 years 2,647 730 3.63  2,432 6.01 
Expects to receive a bequest 3,291 985 3.34  1,413 6.90 
Industry: Manufacturing 1,154 534 2.16  819 4.47 
Industry: Public administration, military -2,207 1,250 -1.77  -326 -1.05 
Eligibility * Age 45 – 55 in 1995 10,882 2,184 4.98  1,334 3.02 
Eligibility * Both head and spouse work -3,553 1,901 -1.87  -2,354 -5.50 
Eligibility * Owns home 6,487 1,236 5.25  3,268 10.24 
Eligibility * Reason for saving: retirement 9,303 2,548 3.65  351 0.95 
Eligibility * Does not anticipate major expense 
in next 5 to 10 years 44 1,640 0.03  -631 -1.75 
                                                        
25 Poterba et.al and Benjamin use IRA status to identify good saver. 
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Eligibility * See bad health as a major expense 4,622 3,999 1.16  1,870 2.66 
Eligibility * Savings horizon is greater 
than 10 years 461 2,131 0.22  -1,426 -3.58 
Eligibility * Leaving a bequest is 
somewhat important -921 1,567 -0.59  -425 -1.76 
Eligibility * Willing to take above average 
investment risk 10,377 2,375 4.37  1,238 4.88 
Eligibility * Place of employment has 
greater than 500 employees 3,589 1,470 2.44  1,129 3.53 
 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is non-housing net worth 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat  
Marginal 
Effect T-stat 
Intercept -3,145 943 -3.34  1,656 5.43 
Eligibility -204 2,401 -0.09  2,995 5.06 
1998 SCF 390 622 0.63  -189 -0.55 
2001 SCF -983 741 -1.33  -532 -1.86 
Eligibility * 1998 SCF 3,780 2,221 1.70  1,454 2.20 
Eligibility * 2001 SCF 1,627 2,445 0.67  598 1.01 
Income: $30k - $50k 4,239 1,028 4.12  4,141 7.99 
Income: $50k - $80k 18,910 2,075 9.11  9,295 12.57 
Income: $80k - $150k 80,591 8,664 9.30  19,302 17.60 
Income: > $150k 203,756 11,972 17.02  24,702 18.29 
Age: 45 – 55 in 1995 3,889 1,066 3.65  2,090 5.29 
Education: Graduate school 8,713 2,206 3.95  2,520 5.00 
Married 3,529 696 5.07  1,665 5.68 
Both head and spouse work -1,883 1,217 -1.55  -209 -0.49 
Number of household members -432 244 -1.77  -441 -5.12 
Head of household is not white -1,559 589 -2.65  -1,431 -5.80 
Has an IRA 48,258 2,469 19.55  9,735 26.43 
Has other account type pension plan 15,842 1,929 8.21  5,165 12.70 
Owns home 7,259 737 9.85  4,572 15.66 
Does not anticipate major expense 
in next 5 to 10 years 3,547 647 5.48  879 2.83 
Sees child’s education as a major expense 2,485 1,050 2.37  700 2.07 
Savings horizon greater than 10 years 3,523 1,090 3.23  2,398 4.84 
Expects to receive a bequest 5,027 1,381 3.64  1,613 4.82 
Leaving a bequest is very important 1,108 581 1.91  500 2.22 
Willing to take substantial investment risk 1,799 1,893 0.95  899 1.76 
Willing to take average investment risk 2,922 658 4.44  1,714 5.15 
Industry: Public administration, military -720 1,581 -0.46  153 0.31 
Eligibility * Income: $80k - $150k -6,765 10,425 -0.65  -4,149 -5.08 
Eligibility * Age 45 – 55 in 1995 14,006 2,514 5.57  1,579 2.28 
Eligibility * Education: Some College 1,117 1,993 0.56  848 2.27 
Eligibility * Divorced -5,006 1,935 -2.59  -1,017 -2.52 
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 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat  
Marginal 
Effect T-stat 
Eligibility * Both head and spouse work -8,054 2,389 -3.37  -3,268 -7.20 
Eligibility * Reason for saving: retirement 17,545 2,512 6.98  3,270 9.04 
Eligibility * 
See bad health as a major expense 3,842 4,092 0.94  1,194 1.64 
Eligibility * 
Savings horizon greater than 10 years -3,799 2,276 -1.67  -2,775 -4.79 
Eligibility * 
Leaving a bequest is somewhat important -457 1,652 -0.28  -610 -2.22 
Eligibility * 
Willing to take above average investment risk 11,578 2,713 4.27  2,826 8.52 
Eligibility * Expects economy to perform 
worse in the next five years 5,268 1,823 2.89  848 1.73 
Eligibility * Place of employment has greater 
than 500 employees 1,959 1,538 1.27  372 0.76 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable is net worth 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat  
Marginal 
Effect T-stat 
Intercept -8,581 1,800 -4.77  3,096 8.09 
Eligibility 646 3,596 0.18  1,362 2.81 
1998 SCF -1,075 1,213 -0.89  -838 -2.63 
2001 SCF -2,592 1,508 -1.72  -1,074 -3.21 
Eligibility * 1998 SCF 5,142 2,832 1.82  731 1.41 
Eligibility * 2001 SCF 1,265 3,316 0.38  606 1.15 
Income: $30k - $50k 4,677 1,496 3.13  2,163 8.67 
Income: $50k - $80k 27,447 3,498 7.85  3,677 9.48 
Income: $80k - $150k 138,341 11,392 12.14  6,460 9.25 
Income: > $150k 280,553 35,137 7.98  8,978 7.18 
Age: 45 – 55 in 1995 8,773 1,664 5.27  1,910 5.72 
Education: Graduate school 9,269 4,692 1.98  906 1.46 
Married 5,887 1,187 4.96  529 1.89 
Both head and spouse work -6,810 2,232 -3.05  -67 -0.21 
Number of household members -155 399 -0.39  -207 -2.46 
Head of household is not white -1,822 1,010 -1.80  -881 -3.22 
Has an IRA 66,634 4,272 15.60  2,928 8.99 
Has other account type pension plan 14,432 2,513 5.74  1,407 4.80 
Owns home 46,749 2,356 19.84  6,414 20.01 
Does not anticipate major expense in next 5 to 
10 years 5,656 1,163 4.86  78 0.32 
Sees child’s education as a major expense 1,199 1,440 0.83  108 0.36 
Savings horizon between 1 and 10 years 3,236 1,178 2.75  1,017 3.86 
Savings horizon greater than 10 years 6,153 2,087 2.95  1,710 3.44 
Expects to receive a bequest 5,365 1,653 3.25  515 1.63 
Willing to take above average investment risk 5,924 2,220 2.67  589 1.86 
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 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat  
Marginal 
Effect T-stat 
Willing to take average investment risk 2,979 1,079 2.76  427 2.00 
Expects economy to perform worse in the next 
five years 849 1,129 0.75  17 0.05 
Industry: Finance, insurance, real estate, 
repair services 3,496 1,453 2.41  445 1.40 
Eligibility * Income: $80k - $150k -36,199 14,579 -2.48  -1,191 -1.71 
Eligibility * Age 45 – 55 in 1995 25,534 4,747 5.38  -268 -0.59 
Eligibility * Education: Finished High School 1,083 2,796 0.39  23 0.07 
Eligibility * Education: Some College 5,368 3,115 1.72  349 0.95 
Eligibility * Education: Graduate School 5,454 8,313 0.66  -284 -0.37 
Eligibility * Divorced -4,520 3,574 -1.26  -268 -0.55 
Eligibility * Both head and spouse work -10,878 3,325 -3.27  -1,359 -3.10 
Eligibility * Reason for saving: retirement 18,578 4,058 4.58  834 2.49 
Eligibility * See bad health as a major expense 4,125 5,281 0.78  -167 -0.23 
Eligibility * 
Savings horizon greater than 10 years -8,575 5,293 -1.62  -1,369 -2.30 
Eligibility * 
Leaving a bequest is somewhat important -4,228 2,515 -1.68  -308 -1.11 
Eligibility * Expects economy to perform 
worse in the next five years 4,133 4,008 1.03  607 1.30 
Eligibility * 
Place of employment has 
greater than 500 employees 
653 2,092 0.31  -103 -0.34 
 
The savings effect attributable to 401(k) eligibility is also much less for this lower wealth 
group. The coefficients for the levels specifications of the 1995 to 1998 effect are about half as 
large as for the group that includes high net worth households (1,882 versus 3,471 for net 
financial assets, 3,780 versus 8,201 for non-housing net worth, and 5,142 versus 9,993 for net 
worth). As was the case before, the wealth attributable to 401(k) eligibility is small relative to 
other explanatory variables, especially IRA status. Both the levels and IHS specifications 
indicate that there is little or no effect from 1995 to 2001 as the coefficients are insignificantly 
different from zero. A final point worth noting is that the coefficient for the effect on net worth 
in the IHS specification is smaller than the effect on non-housing net worth. This suggests that, 
as with the sample including high wealth households, that housing equity may be the source of 
at least some of the substitution to 401(k) assets. 
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Savings Effects Within Cohorts 
The savings effect might also be a result of increased asset accumulation as a result of 
households going through the lifecycle. Tables nine and ten report the demographic and cohort 
coefficients from equation (2) within the five-year cohorts described earlier. Table nine reports 
the demographic and cohort coefficients for the level and IHS transformation of net financial 
assets and for conciseness  reports only the key eligibility coefficients: Eligibility * Cohort * 
SCFyear for non-housing net worth and net worth. The demographic and saver type variables 
that are in both estimations26 have the same signs and similar magnitudes. For example, having 
an IRA increases net financial asset by $46,802 in the cohort estimations compared with 
$48,973 non-cohort estimations. The positive, significant, and increasing coefficients on the 
cohort variables demonstrate the importance of accounting for the cohort effects. These 
coefficients range from 6,124 for the 30 – 34 cohort to 29,836 for the 60 – 64 cohort. What is 
surprising is just how miniscule the savings effects of 401(k) plans are within most of the 
cohorts. Most of the coefficients are highly insignificantly different from zero as the standard 
errors are very large relative to the point estimates. The 60 – 64 cohort for the level of non-
housing net worth specification and, with the exception of the 30 – 34 cohort, all of the level of 
net worth cohort are the only coefficients that are greater than 1,000. In fact, the net worth 
coefficients follow a similar pattern as the regressions in previous section in that the levels 
coefficients indicate that there may be a 401(k) plan savings effect as the eligibility * SCF01 
coefficients are larger than the eligibility * SCF98 coefficients but the coefficients for IHS 
transformation of net worth are very small, indicating that much of the growth in net worth 
attributable to 401(k) plans is a result of asset appreciation and not increased contributions. 
This is not surprising as one of the features of the economy in recent years has been the very 
strong housing market. 
                                                        
26 I conducted the testing down methodology a second for the cohort specifications which resulted in a slightly 
different mix of explanatory variables. 
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Table nine: Results of estimating equation (2). Full set of coefficients for the effect within 
cohorts of 401(k) eligibility on net financial assets 
 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat 
 Marginal 
Effect T-stat 
Intercept -9,925 995 -9.97  -6,621 -15.95 
Eligibility 16,626 3,048 5.46  12,760 12.92 
Income: $80k - $150k 50,822 4,407 11.53  7,615 25.60 
Income: > $150k 413,467 51,551 8.02  25,316 14.41 
Education: Graduate school 14,979 3,260 4.60  3,029 7.10 
Has a defined benefit plan -1,301 724 -1.80  -196 -0.83 
Has an IRA 46,802 2,725 17.18  9,162 45.80 
Has other account type pension plan 8,637 1,861 4.64  5,374 13.73 
Anticipates receiving a bequest 4,715 1,265 3.73  2,145 7.39 
Leaving a bequest is very important 1,539 666 2.31  842 4.33 
Place of employment has greater 
than 500 employees 1,418 829 1.71 
 943 5.62 
Eligibility * Income: $80k - $150k -94,597 58,767 -1.61  -7,539 -4.05 
Eligibility * Both head and spouse work -10,471 1,717 -6.10  -2,923 -9.82 
Eligibility * Has other account type pension plan 15,044 3,927 3.83  -1,311 -2.03 
Eligibility * Owns home 9,516 1,558 6.11  5,346 14.21 
Eligibility * Reason for saving: retirement 13,342 2,343 5.69  3,148 9.77 
Cohort 30 - 34 6,124 1,345 4.55  4,732 5.60 
Cohort 35 – 39 6,448 2,190 2.94  5,883 11.86 
Cohort 40 – 44 9,384 1,863 5.04  7,327 15.32 
Cohort 45 – 49 9,709 1,237 7.85  8,388 11.70 
Cohort 50 – 54 11,629 2,605 4.46  11,556 10.42 
Cohort 55 – 59 10,622 1,979 5.37  8,676 6.23 
Cohort 60 – 64 29,836 4,154 7.18  15,709 15.60 
Eligibility * Cohort 30 - 34 -254 2,653 -0.10  -139 -0.16 
Eligibility * Cohort 35 – 39 -288 2,899 -0.10  -166 -0.25 
Eligibility * Cohort 40 – 44 -211 3,894 -0.05  -150 -0.21 
Eligibility * Cohort 45 – 49 -273 3,250 -0.08  -186 -0.24 
Eligibility * Cohort 50 – 54 4 10,802 0.00  -177 -0.16 
Eligibility * Cohort 55 – 59 -175 5,732 -0.03  -157 -0.15 
Eligibility * Cohort 60 – 64 -106 20,914 -0.01  -214 -0.15 
Cohort < 30 * Year 1998 32 800 0.04  35 0.06 
Cohort < 30 * Year 2001 95 662 0.14  66 0.17 
Cohort 30 – 34 * Year 1998 -7 1,421 0.00  2 0.00 
Cohort 30 – 34 * Year 2001 0 1,019 0.00  4 0.01 
Cohort 35 – 39 * Year 1998 40 2,109 0.02  9 0.03 
Cohort 35 – 39 * Year 2001 29 2,061 0.01  1 0.00 
Cohort 40 – 44  * Year 1998 -12 1,579 -0.01  -10 -0.02 
Cohort 40 – 44 * Year 2001 10 1,406 0.01  4 0.01 
Cohort 45 – 49 * Year 1998 25 1,348 0.02  16 0.03 
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 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat 
 Marginal 
Effect T-stat 
Cohort 45 – 49 * Year 2001 21 2,389 0.01  14 0.02 
Cohort 50 – 54 * Year 1998 23 3,317 0.01  -29 -0.03 
Cohort 50 – 54 * Year 2001 -9 1,433 -0.01  -35 -0.04 
Cohort 55 – 59 * Year 1998 397 8,476 0.05  48 0.05 
Cohort 55 – 59 * Year 2001 171 8,745 0.02  58 0.06 
Cohort 60 – 64 * Year 1998 -117 8,923 -0.01  -47 -0.05 
Cohort 60 – 64 * Year 2001 -204 15,751 -0.01  -74 -0.06 
Eligibility * Cohort < 30 * Year 1998 -206 1,803 -0.11  -137 -0.18 
Eligibility * Cohort < 30 * Year 2001 -284 1,910 -0.15  -170 -0.29 
Eligibility * Cohort 30 – 34 * Year 1998 37 3,194 0.01  -10 -0.01 
Eligibility * Cohort 30 – 34 * Year 2001 58 2,906 0.02  5 0.01 
Eligibility * Cohort 35 – 39 * Year 1998 68 4,138 0.02  39 0.06 
Eligibility * Cohort 35 – 39 * Year 2001 129 3,276 0.04  40 0.07 
Eligibility * Cohort 40 – 44  * Year 1998 49 5,154 0.01  15 0.02 
Eligibility * Cohort 40 – 44 * Year 2001 85 4,998 0.02  9 0.01 
Eligibility * Cohort 45 – 49 * Year 1998 275 8,350 0.03  38 0.04 
Eligibility * Cohort 45 – 49 * Year 2001 101 7,585 0.01  5 0.01 
Eligibility * Cohort 50 – 54 * Year 1998 -125 14,943 -0.01  30 0.02 
Eligibility * Cohort 50 – 54 * Year 2001 168 22,666 0.01  40 0.03 
Eligibility * Cohort 55 – 59 * Year 1998 -211 14,721 -0.01  -33 -0.03 
Eligibility * Cohort 55 – 59 * Year 2001 747 43,200 0.02  6 0.00 
Eligibility * Cohort 60 – 64 * Year 1998 447 43,168 0.01  45 0.02 
Eligibility * Cohort 60 – 64 * Year 2001 567 88,135 0.01  101 0.04 
 
 
Table ten: Key coefficients from estimation of equation (2): Eligibility effect within cohorts for 
non-housing net worth and net worth 
  Non-Housing Net Worth  Net Worth 
  Level  IHS  Transformation 
 Level  IHS  Transformation 
  Coeff Std. Error T-Stat 
 Marginal 
Effect T-Stat 
 Coeff Std. Error T-Stat 
 Marginal 
Effect T-Stat 
Eligibility * 
SCF98 
-337 1,910 -0.18  -194 -0.18  9,555 2,797 3.42  -122 -0.28 Cohort 
< 30 Eligibility * 
SCF01 -374 2,154 -0.17 
 -226 -0.29  12,781 3,688 3.47  -145 -0.39 
Eligibility * 
SCF98 117 3,158 0.04 
 51 -0.01  870 5,317 0.16  14 0.03 Cohort
30 – 
34  Eligibility * 
SCF01 159 3,446 0.05 
 60 0.01  983 5,811 0.17  11 0.02 
Eligibility * 
SCF98 151 4,593 0.03 
 66 0.06  1,608 5,960 0.27  19 0.04 Cohort
35 – 
39 Eligibility * 
SCF01 146 3,655 0.04 
 59 0.07  1,762 9,503 0.19  17 0.03 
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  Non-Housing Net Worth  Net Worth 
  Level  IHS  Transformation 
 Level  IHS  Transformation 
Eligibility * 
SCF98 79 6,159 0.01 
 30 0.02  2,334 10,491 0.22  16 0.03 Cohort40 – 
44  Eligibility * 
SCF01 97 5,929 0.02 
 39 0.01  1,864 8,796 0.21  20 0.04 
Eligibility * 
SCF98 489 9,327 0.05 
 104 0.04  3,099 17,891 0.17  36 0.06 Cohort
45 – 
49 Eligibility * 
SCF01 137 10,844 0.01 
 52 0.01  2,988 16,381 0.18  11 0.02 
Eligibility * 
SCF98 -40 16,943 0 
 25 0.02  4,786 23,651 0.2  31 0.04 Cohort
50 – 
54  Eligibility * 
SCF01 47 22,497 0 
 17 0.03  5,456 25,907 0.21  22 0.03 
Eligibility * 
SCF98 -34 16,339 0 
 -34 -0.03  8,461 38,015 0.22  11 0.01 Cohort
55 – 
59 Eligibility * 
SCF01 1,175 34,181 0.03 
 71 0  11,260 42,392 0.27  32 0.04 
Eligibility * 
SCF98 1,009 49,665 0.02 
 149 0.02  8,161 61,883 0.13  28 0.02 Cohort
60 – 
64  Eligibility * 
SCF01 1,020 96,112 0.01 
 81 0.04  17,384 127,360 0.14  55 0.04 
 
The less than 30 cohort, at least in the levels specification, indicates increased asset 
accumulation. This almost certainly a result of this group’s first time eligibility and participation 
in 401(k) plans, perhaps in their first full-time career employment. The effect is quite large, 
however with $9,555 (from 1995 to 1998) and $12,781 (from 1995 to 2001) of additional net 
worth attributable to 401(k) plans which is larger than any other cohort other than the 60 – 64 
group (which likely faces retirement in the very near future). It may be that this youngest cohort 
is receiving the message about the need to rely on one’s own savings for retirement and the 
benefits of beginning to save early in the lifecycle. This is only speculation at this point, but it 
will be interesting to see if there continues to be asset accumulation for this group when the 
results of the 2004 survey are released in 2005, allowing for direct comparison. 
Collinearity 
The main reason using the testing down methodology for variable selection is to reach a 
parsimonious model specification. Given the richness of the SCF there are many potential 
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variables to include as explanatory variables and including them all would certainly result in 
over fitting the model with many highly correlated variables potentially causing harmful 
collinearity. This was indeed the case with an earlier draft of this paper. I examine the impact of 
collinearity using two diagnostic tools: the variance decomposition of D.A. Belsley, E. Kuh, and 
R.E. Welsch (BKW) (1980) as described in R. Carter Hill and Lee C. Adkins (2001) and the more 
well-known variance inflation factors as described in chapter eleven of Peter Kennedy (1998). 
The variance decomposition of BKW involves examining the proportion of the variance of each 
least squares coefficient contributed by each eigenvalue. There are several steps to the BKW 
diagnostic procedure. The first step is to determine the condition index, which is the square root 
of the ratio of the largest to smallest eigenvalue of the cross-product (X’X) matrix. A high 
condition index reflects the presence of multicollinearity, with the recommendation that 
condition indices greater than 30 are deserving of closer inspection. For each explanatory 
variable, the proportion of the variance of each parameter associated with each eigenvalue can 
be examined to identify the variables affected by the collinearity. If the variance proportion is 
less than 50 percent the variable is not adversely affected by collinearity. The more well-known 
variance inflation factor is given by iR
2 1(1 )--  where iR
2 is the R-squared measure from 
regressing the ith independent variable on all the other independent variables. Kennedy (1998, 
p. 190) suggests using a VIF greater than ten as an indication of harmful collinearity. The VIF’s 
have a high degree of correlation with the BKW method. In contrast to the first draft of this 
paper that did not use the testing down approach, there appears to be no harmful collinearity in 
the final estimations. For example, in the net financial asset regressions that do not account for 
cohort effects the largest condition index is 15.79 and only the intercept and eligibility indicator 
have VIF’s larger than ten. In the cohort effect estimations there is some collinearity as a result 
of my decision to include all of the cohort variables, although the largest condition index is 
24.65, which is less than the recommended cut off point of 30. Only the intercept and eligibility 
indicator have proportions of variance associated with the largest eigenvalue greater than fifty 
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percent; the VIFs are also larger than 10 for these variables and for the Cohort 30 – 34 * 
eligibility and the Cohort 35 – 39 * eligibility variables. There is no harmful collinearity present 
in either the demographic and saver type variables and in the 401(k) savings effect within cohort 
variables.27 In addition, the coefficients that indicate the savings effects of 401(k) plans within 
the cohorts are so small that it is unlikely that efforts at reducing their standard errors would be 
make these coefficients significant. 
Concluding Discussion 
This paper finds little evidence that the assets of 401(k) plans represent new savings and 
so these results fit in broadly with the substitution camp of the issue. Any savings effect that the 
data initially reveals is eliminated once lifecycle savings effects are accounted for. What appears 
to be happening is that good savers are attracted to firms that have 401(k) plans, which seems to 
support Richard A. Ippolito's (1997) notions of retirement benefits playing a sorting role where 
low discounters (good savers) are attracted to firms with pension plans. What seems likely is 
that good savers are making use of 401(k) plans but many households are either not using them 
or are not are not using them as policy makers envisioned. Asset substitution is a very real 
concern because of the tax breaks that 401(k) contributions receive as well as the possible use of 
401(k) plans as a model for the private accounts currently being discussed in Social Security 
reform proposals. The point of the 401(k) tax benefit and employer match is to increase the 
return on savings which should encourage households to save more.  If much of the recent 
evidence, including this paper, is correct and households are not using the plans to increase 
their savings then it could be the case that they are increasing their consumption.  This is 
possible in a setting where households have a target savings level and so can achieve their future 
savings goal while giving up less consumption. Given the evidence that people say they are 
worried about their retirement security this strikes me as not so plausible. More likely seems to 
be that the preference for current consumption is so great that it swamps the desire to save for 
                                                        
27 I have omitted the collinearity diagnostics tables, but they are available on request. 
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future consumption—this lends some credence to the myopic models that are currently receiving 
attention in the behavioral finance literature.  If true, then one implication is that the marginal 
utility of wealth is very low for 401(k) eligible households. Perhaps implausibly low, since 401(k) 
eligible households are thought to be have low discount rates (high marginal utility of wealth) 
relative to ineligible households, suggesting that ineligible households have extremely low 
marginal utilities of wealth. With regards to the private accounts in Social Security, this research 
suggests caution in applying the 401(k) model. Mandatory private accounts would cover workers 
with higher savings propensities, like 401(k) eligible workers, but also workers with lower 
savings propensities, with perhaps unforeseen consequences. It is possible to make the case that 
mandatory private accounts for all workers would increase savings rates, but that does not seem 
the most likely outcome. 
A likely outcome is the continued use of 401(k) plans to offset other savings or increase 
current consumption. Using 401(k) plans to finance current consumption may not be a strategy 
actively pursued by individuals, just as the automobile purchase example from the introduction 
may not be a conscious choice. However, non-participants to 401(k) plans must be subsidizing 
some consumption choices of plan participants given the amount of defined contribution plan 
contributions ($167 billion in 1998) and corresponding lost government revenue. It should be 
noted that the flip side of the savings / consumption coin—that 401(k) plans lead to higher 
consumption—has not been established, but it does suggest a possible next step in the 
investigation. 
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 Chapter 2: The Relationship Between Saver Characteristics 
and Asset Accumulation: A Comparison of Households With and 
Without Outstanding Loans among 401(k) Plan Participants 
 
Introduction 
The major trend in saving for retirement over the past twenty years has been the shift 
from the defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) pension plans. In the more familiar 
DB plan an employee is guaranteed a monthly retirement income using a formula based on their 
wages and length of service. In a defined contribution plan, however, an employee accumulates 
money in an account that usually receives tax benefits and draws on these funds for retirement 
income. The most common DC plan is the 401(k) plan, named after the relevant section of the 
tax code.28 One of the intriguing features of the 401(k) plans is the ability of the account holder 
to access the funds before retirement either by borrowing against or making withdrawals from 
the account. Borrowing is usually the preferred option, as will be explained in the next section; 
there are generally no provisions for accessing DB assets before retirement. This paper examines 
several issues concerning borrowing against one’s 401(k) plan. After a general discussion of 
401(k) plan borrowing and I offer a more extensive analysis of some issues than is available in 
the relevant, though limited, literature. First, I use a logit regression to estimate the factors in 
determining whether a household has an outstanding loan against their retirement plan. Then, I 
simulate the impact that a loan might have on retirement wealth. Finally, I examine whether 
households that have an outstanding loan save differently from households without an 
outstanding 401(k) loan. General conclusions from the paper are that households with a current 
loan may have borrowed because of limited access to other sources funds, they appear to be 
trying to maintain their retirement savings, although it may be at the expense of other financial 
assets, and that borrowing could have a relatively minor impact on retirement wealth for 
disciplined savers, but a potentially major impact for undisciplined savers. 
                                                        
28 401(k) plans are for private workforce employees; public employees have 403(b) plans which are similar to 
401(k) plans and are included in 401(k) plans for the analysis of this paper. 
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Borrowing Against a Retirement Plan 
There is much concern from both policy makers and the general public regarding the 
adequacy of savings for retirement, especially as the baby-boom generation begins reaching 
retirement age. A recent survey by the Gallup Organization (Gallup (2004)) indicates that 
retirement planning is Americans’ leading financial worry. In fact, 57 percent of non-retired 
individuals are very or moderately worried about having enough money for retirement. Part of 
the reason for the worry might be attributed to the increasing adoption of defined contribution 
pension plans by employers. Figure one illustrates this changing nature of employer provided 
pension plans using data provided by the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (2002), 
a division of the Department of Labor. While DB plans accounted for over sixty-five percent of 
pension plans with at least 100 participants in 1979, by 1998 less than twenty-four percent of 
pension plans with 100 participants were of the defined benefit type.  
Figure one: Number of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans with 
more than 100 participents
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While there are many potential explanations for the reason behind this shift of pension 
provision (see William G. Gale and Joseph M. Milano (1998) or Alicia H. Munnell and Annika 
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Sunden (2004) for discussions of the implications of and reasons for this shift), for employees 
one of the most important features of DC accounts is that the employee (account holder) bears 
the risk and responsibility for maintaining the account. This has both advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, the employee alone makes the contribution and investment 
decisions so there usually is no recourse to having a shortfall of assets at retirement, particularly 
if the shortfall is a result of inadequate contributions or poor investment returns on the plans’ 
assets.29 On the other hand, the tax advantages and employer contributions allow significant 
asset accumulation to occur, with the account holder able to transfer the assets to other tax 
favored accounts upon separation from the current employer; there is no portability of defined 
benefit plan assets for an employee. 
While an employee has no access to the funds in a defined benefit plan, often the account 
holder can withdraw or borrow funds from a 401(k) plan.30 Withdrawal is usually the less 
attractive option because the withdrawn funds are subject to ordinary income taxes and, if the 
account holder is less than age 59 ½ and the withdraw is not for a “hardship” reason,31 a 10 
percent tax penalty must be paid. The IRS imposes this penalty in order to “discourage the use 
of pension funds for purposes other than normal retirement” (IRS (2002)). Allowing borrowing 
from retirement plans allow participants to avoid paying the income taxes and the penalty. 
Most conventional advice warns against borrowing from a 401(k) plan. The Wall Street 
Journal (May 1, 2003, page D1) offers a typical admonition by noting that borrowing against a 
401(k) plan is a good way to postpone retirement and that using 401(k) loans for consumer 
purchases is almost always a bad idea. There are several reasons for this advice. First, borrowed 
funds do not accumulate market investment returns, leaving the account holder with fewer 
                                                        
29 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Board insures DB plans in order to protect workers’ pension benefit should an 
employer go bankrupt. DC plans have no such guarantees. Recall the Enron debacle, where many employees’ 401(k) 
plans were nearly worthless because they held large amounts of Enron stock. 
30 Withdrawals, borrowing, and taking a lump sum distribution upon changing jobs are referred to as “leakages” by 
Alicia H. Munnell and Annika Sunden (2004). 
31 The IRS (publication 575) lists a number of hardship withdraws that are not subject to the 10 percent penalty. 
These include education and medical expenses, or down payment on a first home.  
 55
assets at retirement. Second, to the extent that 401(k) plans represent a commitment 
mechanism for retirement savings (for example, as a mental account in the Richard H. Thaler 
and Hersch M. Shefrin’s (1981) sense or the illiquid asset in David Laibson’s (1997) hyperbolic 
discounting model of undisciplined savers) allowing early access to retirement funds can 
undermine dedicated savings behaviors, especially for bad savers who value the limited access to 
funds that retirement accounts engender. The largest potential negative result of borrowing 
against a retirement plan occurs if an employee ends their relationship with their employer 
whether by quitting or lay-off. In this case the loan usually must be repaid immediately or it is 
considered a withdrawal and subject to the taxes and penalties mentioned earlier.  
There are several advantages to borrowing from a 401(k) plan rather than making a 
withdrawal or borrowing from more conventional sources. The application process is 
inexpensive32, involves little paperwork, and loan approval is nearly certain; in addition, there 
are no credit checks, which can be important for households in financial difficulty. The loan 
usually has an attractive interest rate of one or two percentage points above the prime rate. In 
addition, the interest payments are credited to the 401(k) account rather than a lending 
institution, which reduces the cost of the loan to the difference between the loan interest rate 
and the returns on the plan assets. Some plans allow the borrower to choose which assets to 
liquidate for the loan, while other plans reduce all assets held equally, which may require a 
portfolio rebalancing by the borrower. 
 Allowing the borrowing of funds may increase 401(k) plan participation and 
contribution rates— especially among lower wage workers. The General Accounting Office (GAO 
(1997)), using IRS form 5500 data from 1992, finds that among plans that allow borrowing 
participation rates are 5.91 percent higher, contribution levels are 36.8 percent higher, and 
contribution rates are 3.02 percent higher compared with plans that do not allow borrowing. 
Patrick J. Bayer, B. Douglas Bernheim, and John Karl Scholz (1996) find mixed evidence on the 
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relationship between participation decisions and borrowing provisions depending on the sample 
used; there is a negative, though insignificant, relationship for samples of highly compensated 
or non-highly compensated employees and a positive and insignificant relationship for the full 
sample of all employees.33 These results suggest that households may be reluctant to use 
voluntary retirement accounts if there is no access to the funds, especially in an emergency. 
Another reason for firms to encourage lower wage workers to participate in the 401(k) plan is 
that it helps the plan to meet non-discrimination requirements.34 
 Other loan provisions include that, with the exception of borrowing for housing 
purposes, the funds usually must be repaid within five years. At the plan’s discretion housing 
loans may have up to a 20-year term. Note also that borrowing is allowed only from 401(k) or 
403(b) plans and not from other tax-advantaged retirement plans such as Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs), Keogh, or SIMPLE plans. 
The impact that borrowing against a 401(k) plan has on the amount of retirement assets 
at retirement (assumed to be at age 65) depends on several factors. The difference between the 
loan interest rate and rate of return on the borrowed funds represents the opportunity cost of 
the borrowed funds; that is, the borrowed assets are not receiving their investment rate of return 
(i.e. from the mutual fund) but rather the prime plus one or two percent as the loan contract 
indicates. It’s important to note that from the perspective of a household’s balance sheet the 
loan is a reshuffling of assets from the retirement account asset (i.e. mutual fund holding) to the 
loan, which has a lower return. In fact, one of the key advantages of borrowing from the 401(k) 
account is that the interest payments are not going to a lending institution, but are accumulated 
in the retirement account.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
32 The Profit Sharing Council of America (http://www.401k.org/401kloans.asp) indicates that 70 percent of plans 
charge a one-time loan fee up to $100 and another 25 percent charge a yearly service fee up to $75. 
33 Their data is based on the KPMG Peat Marwick Retirement Benefits Survey of nearly 600 companies with 401(k) 
plans which may or may not be representative of all retirement plans. 
34 In order for a defined contribution plan to receive favorable tax treatment it must meet certain IRS tests to ensure 
that the plan benefits rank and file workers and not just company owners and highly compensated employees. See 
Stephen J. Butler (1999) for further discussion of testing a plan for non-discrimination. 
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Another important consideration is whether the household suspends contributions 
during the loan period; the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) indicates that 92 percent of 
households with a loan continue their 401(k) contributions during the period that the loan is 
outstanding. However, for the other eight percent, given that the typical loan term is five years, 
the impact on wealth at retirement is likely to be substantial. 
The age of the borrower also has an impact. Younger households likely may be more 
tempted to borrow against retirement savings for several reasons. These households are 
probably twenty to thirty years away from retirement so they may lack the imperative to 
accumulate retirement savings; at this point in their lifecycle they may feel that their savings are 
better used for a home purchase or may be unwilling to have funds committed to a retirement 
plan that could not be used for emergency spending.35 Younger households also have more time 
to make up for the lost returns or contributions that the borrowing enjoins. A negative aspect is 
that the longer the household the waits before catching up with their contributions the larger the 
opportunity cost of the loan is. For example, a 45 year old—planning to retire at age 65—that 
doesn’t increase future contributions to account for the loan loses twenty years of interest while 
a 35 year old loses thirty years of interest. 
Finally, a point that is not widely emphasized, although it is pointed out by Mary 
Rowland (1998) and David Braze at the Motley Fool website36, is that because contributions to 
401(k) plans are made with pre-tax money the borrowed funds are pre-tax money but are paid 
back with after tax dollars. This means that a borrower in the 28% tax bracket has to earn $139 
pre-tax for every $100 in loan payments. 
Very little academic literature appears to be available regarding borrowing against a 
retirement plan with only two sources directly related to 401(k) plan borrowing (Alicia H. 
Munnell and Annica Sunden (2004) and the Government Accounting Office (1997)). One reason 
                                                        
35 While the interest payments on a retirement account loan for a home purchase are not tax deductible, it may make 
sense to use the loan for (part of) the down payment since this is essentially an asset swap. 
36 The Motley Fool (http://www.fool.com) is an online personal finance resource. 
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is that 401(k) plan loans have only been receiving attention in the past few years as 401(k) plans 
have become more widespread. A related reason has to do with data availability. It seems that 
few commonly available data sets have information regarding pension plan loans. However, the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a nationally representative survey conducted on behalf of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, has been collecting detailed information on 
household pension plans—including loans—since 1995. That data is used here in the empirical 
analysis that follows. 
Data 
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a triennial survey conducted on behalf of 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the most recently available was conducted from 
March to October of 2001. The SCF collects very detailed information on US household finances, 
such as types of assets owned and their values, amount and types of debt and loans owed, 
detailed demographic information on household members, and a number of opinion variables 
that can proxy for saver type in data analysis. I use the three most recent surveys: 1995, 1998, 
and 2001. Each survey interviews different sets of households so there are three separate cross 
sections rather than one panel data set: the SCF could thought of as a balance sheet of American 
household finances. The SCF is also considered to be among the highest quality of wealth data 
available (Richard T Curtin, F. Thomas Juster and James N. Morgan (1989). Approximately 
about 4,300 households are interviewed in each survey with approximately 1,200 of the 
households having a defined contribution pension plan which they are able to borrow against. 
Two important issues with the SCF are the handling of missing values and the over 
sampling of wealthy households. With regards to missing values, Karen Pence (2001) points out 
that missing data are a particular problem with wealth data because people may be reluctant to 
provide information about certain assets or an asset, for example real estate or a business, may 
be difficult to value. To handle missing values, the SCF uses multiple imputation (MI), 
developed by Donald Rubin (1987) and explained in detail by Arthur Kennickell (1998). In MI, a 
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missing value is imputed five times from the estimated conditional distribution of the variable. 
Essentially, there are five observations for each household, with potentially five different values 
for data points that were originally missing. For estimation purposes, the usual procedure, 
explained by Pence or C.P. Montalto and J. Sung (1996), is to run separate regressions over each 
of the five implicates. The point estimate is the average of the five estimates and the standard 
error is the average of the five standard errors, with an adjustment made for the imputation 
variance. In appendix A, the method for adjusting the standard errors is explained. The method 
raises the standard errors of the point estimates and may lead to insignificant point estimates, 
although they may be significant without the additional adjustment for the imputation. 
The distribution of wealth in the US is highly skewed; that is, a few households hold 
much of the wealth in the US. A true random sample of US households would include many 
households with relatively little wealth and would have little information on the nature of most 
of the assets held by households. In order to get a good feel for asset holdings among US 
households the SCF over samples wealthy households so that there are “too many” wealthy 
households in the survey relative to the US population. In order to make data analysis applicable 
to the US population the survey data includes a variable for weighting the households’ 
observations so that results are applicable to the US population. Analysis that does not weight 
the observations will have estimates that are not representative of the US population. All of the 
results reported in this paper are weighted so as to be representative of the US population. The 
skewness of wealth data also impacts regression estimates when the dependent variable is a 
measure of wealth. As explained in the regression section below I apply a transformation similar 
to the natural logarithm to my dependent variables so they are approximately normally 
distributed. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The statistics in table one indicate that 401(k) plan participation rates increase from 
67.96 percent in 1995 to 75.58 percent in 1998. The participation rate fell by one-half of one 
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percent from 1998 to 2001. While 91 to 95 percent of participants are able to make withdrawals 
from their plan (even if the withdrawal includes a penalty), the percentage of plans allowing 
borrowing increased from 65.25 percent in 1995 to 74.97 percent in 1998, then to 76.61 percent 
in 2001. The increase in borrowing ability may have contributed to the increase in participation 
rates from 1995 to 1998, but the rising stock market and increased media attention on 401(k) 
plans during that time likely played a larger role. The percentage of households with a loan 
increased from 13.82 percent to 16.22 percent from 1995 to 1998, then decreased to 13.11 
percent in 2001. The loan balances are fairly modest with about 80 percent of loans having an 
outstanding balance of less than $10,000.37 Although households can borrow up to 50 percent of 
their account balance most households seem to be borrowing less than a quarter of their account 
balances as the outstanding loan balance as a percentage of the 401(k) account balance is about 
20 percent. Most of the households that have outstanding loans are where the head of the 
household is less than 50 years old. This is consistent with Christopher D. Carroll and Andrew A. 
Samwick (1997) and Christopher D. Carroll (who find that households begin saving for 
retirement around the age of 50. There are few loans for households where the head of the 
household is older than 59. On one hand, this is not surprising as there is no penalty for 
withdrawals after 59 ½; however, since ordinary income taxes must be paid on the withdrawn 
funds it may be advantageous for this group to borrow rather than make a withdrawal, thereby 
deferring the taxes until they are retired and, presumably, in a lower tax bracket. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
37 A limitation of using cross-sectional data such as the SCF is that there information about the loan balance at the 
time of the survey but there is no indication of the amount actually borrowed or when the loan was taken out. 
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Table one: Descriptive statistics on loan use 
 
 1995 1998 2001 
401(k) plan participation rate 67.96% 75.58% 75.07% 
Percentage of plans that allow withdrawals, even if 
withdrawal involves a penalty 91.33% 92.06% 93.90% 
 
Percentage of households participating in 401(k) 
plan that can borrow against plan 
 
65.25% 74.97% 76.61% 
Percentage of households that have a loan against 
their 401(k) plan, among plans that allow borrowing 13.82% 16.22% 13.11% 
 
 
   
Mean loan balance $4,758 $5,880 $6,499 
Median loan balance $2,312 $3,810 $3,000 
Largest loan balance $57,792 $41,362 $40,000 
 
    
Ratio of loan balance to 401(k) account balance .20 .19 .19 
 
    
Distribution of loan balances    
Less than $1000 19.52% 15.88% 22.54% 
$1000 - $2499 30.73% 22.63% 18.60% 
$2500 - $4999 24.02% 20.07% 18.88% 
$5000 - $9999 10.19% 24.13% 19.08% 
$10,000 - $24,999 13.95% 15.15% 14.41% 
Greater than $25,000 1.59% 2.14% 6.50% 
 
    
Age of head of household for borrowers    
Younger than 30 2.04% 16.41% 8.99% 
30 – 39 38.79% 30.90% 32.08% 
40 – 49 45.19% 35.34% 38.65% 
50 – 59 11.34% 17.08% 18.64% 
60 –70 2.65% 0.27% 1.63% 
70 – 79 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
As table two indicates, the most common reason for borrowing indicated is for the 
purchase of a home or vacation property or for living expenses or a loan to family / friends. This 
highlights a difficulty plan designers and policy makers face. While borrowing to purchase 
property might be justifiable, as this kind of loan is a swap of long-term assets, borrowing for 
current consumption or for attorney or medical expenses are more problematic. This will 
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certainly have a negative effect on wealth at retirement. However, this needs to be balanced 
against the potentially lower participation rates should loan approval depend on the purpose of 
the loan. There is also no indication of the household’s borrowing decision had the 401(k) loan 
not been available. Some households may have chosen to borrow from another source, such as 
home equity or a finance company loan, while other might have not had this option because of 
poor credit or simply chosen not to borrow at all. 
 
Table two: Stated purpose of loan against 401(k) plan 
 
  Age 
  
Less than 
30 30 - 39 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 
Own home or vacation 
property 19.69% 33.28% 25.58% 19.75% 17.97% 
Home improvements 0.00% 6.15% 11.30% 9.49% 55.12% 
Automobile 4.02% 4.41% 17.91% 9.09% 0.00% 
Appliances or furniture 9.24% 1.97% 2.53% 7.34% 0.00% 
Home electronics / hobbies 0.00% 2.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Recreational vehicles 0.00% 1.71% 0.35% 0.00% 0.00% 
Investments (including 
business, financial, real estate) 
1.12% 2.73% 5.49% 0.81% 0.00% 
Divorce, travel, moving, or 
wedding expenses 21.09% 6.76% 3.63% 7.88% 0.00% 
Medical, attorney, education 
expenses 5.98% 6.46% 14.17% 25.46% 0.00% 
R
ea
so
n
 
Living expenses, loans to 
family / friends 38.86% 34.19% 19.04% 20.19% 26.91% 
 
 
Table three contains descriptive statistics for households that can borrow against their 
401(k) plan, comparing those that have a loan and those that do not. Panel A contains 
information on various wealth measures while panel B contains information on differences in 
demographics and variables related to a household’s saver type. The wealth measures show an 
interesting difference. Both the mean and median borrowers had much larger 401(k) account 
balances than non-borrowers over the sample period, although the difference in means is very 
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slight for 1998 and 2001. The mean borrower had over $6,000 more in 401(k) assets in 1995 
compared to non-borrowers, but this difference was only $107 and $971 in 1998 and 2001. 
Median borrowers had $12,000 more in 401(k) assets in 1995, $7,500 more in 1998, and 
$8,000 more in 2001 compared to non-borrowers. This is likely a result of longer participation 
in their plan. In 1995, borrowers had three more years of plan participation than non-borrowers, 
although the difference was less than one year in 1998 and just less than two years in 2001. It’s 
possible that borrowers feel they need to have “enough” in their retirement account before 
borrowing against the plan. While borrowers had more 401(k) assets, in other measures of 
wealth non-borrowers generally had larger balances, with the differences increasing from 1995 
to 2001. For example, non-borrowers had mean net financial assets $46,000 larger than 
borrowers in 1995; by 2001, this difference increased to nearly $140,000. Non-borrowers’ net 
worth was also increasing relative to borrowers over the sample period. Non-borrowers had 
mean (median) net worth $112,495 ($2,207) greater than non-borrowers in 1995, $198,495 
($27,299) in 1998, and $252,586 ($71,430) in 2001. There is evidence besides the differing 
wealth levels that borrowers are in slightly worse financial condition than non-borrowers. 
Borrowers have more debt on their household balance sheets as evidenced by the slightly higher 
debt-to-assets ratio which ranges from three (in 1995) to eleven (in 1998) percentage points 
higher for borrowers. Related to this is the fact that many more borrowers had been turned 
down for credit in the five years priors to the survey year.38 
Table three: Descriptive statistics of households that are able to borrow against their 401(k) plan 
by borrowing status 
 
Panel A: Financial Statistics 
  1995 SCF 1998 SCF 2001 SCF 
  No Loan Has a Loan No Loan Has a Loan No Loan Has a Loan 
Loan balance Mean $0 $4,281 $0 $5,588 $0 $6,302 
 Median $0 $2,312 $0 $3,374 $0 $3,000 
401(k) assets Mean $39,151 $45,312 $52,541 $52,649 $61,262 $62,233 
                                                        
38 Unfortunately, there is not enough information in the survey to determine whether the 401(k) loan was taken 
before or after having been turned down for credit; only that the household was refused credit in the five years prior 
to the survey and that the household has a 401(k) loan. 
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  1995 SCF 1998 SCF 2001 SCF 
  No Loan Has a Loan No Loan Has a Loan No Loan Has a Loan 
 Median $11,558 $24,272 $16,327 $23,946 $19,000 $27,000 
Retirement assets 
excluding 401(k) Mean $35,948 $31,716 $31,807 $13,424 $48,575 $12,212 
 Median $1 $0 $0 $0 $900 $0 
Financial Assets Mean $163,893 $123,934 $225,455 $114,538 $256,716 $125,380 
 Median $45,251 $50,625 $67,616 $48,551 $71,750 $53,200 
Net Financial Assets Mean $152,590 $105,735 $199,455 $86,756 $242,050 $102,428 
 Median $34,444 $37,449 $53,879 $25,873 $57,640 $38,500 
Non-housing net worth Mean $254,416 $155,554 $317,100 $140,228 $401,221 $203,153 
 Median $60,681 $56,324 $82,669 $49,286 $102,300 $63,500 
Net Worth Mean $313,818 $201,323 $381,336 $183,081 $497,427 $244,841 
 Median $96,870 $94,663 $125,446 $98,147 $171,700 $100,270 
Debt / Assets Mean .40 .43 .38 .49 .38 .44 
Debt / Financial Assets Mean 3.74 2.82 2.65 2.70 3.05 2.90 
 
Panel B: Demographic and Saver Type characteristics 
 
 1995 SCF 1998 SCF 2001 SCF 
 No LoanHas a Loan No Loan Has a Loan No LoanHas a Loan
Can also withdrawal from plan 
(even if includes penalty) 
90.78% 94.37% 91.63% 94.16% 94.08% 92.78% 
Age: Less than 30 18.59% 2.68% 11.09% 15.74% 11.72% 9.61% 
Age: 30 – 39 27.53% 38.58% 32.13% 32.95% 28.21% 32.76% 
Age: 40 – 49 32.44% 45.04% 30.72% 34.49% 35.63% 37.84% 
Age: 50 – 59 17.15% 11.31% 20.07% 16.57% 19.26% 18.09% 
Age: 60 – 69 4.18% 2.39% 5.44% 0.25% 5.09% 1.70% 
Age: 70 – 79 0.12% 0.00% 0.33% 0.00% 0.10% 0.01% 
       
Education: Finished high school 27.84% 24.57% 27.21% 33.15% 21.67% 40.42% 
Education: Some college 26.82% 28.27% 25.71% 28.85% 24.47% 24.35% 
Education: Finished college 25.15% 21.29% 24.27% 17.90% 27.08% 16.69% 
Education: Graduate school 15.57% 16.31% 16.14% 12.65% 20.47% 10.60% 
       
Income: < $10k 0.79% 0.00% 1.01% 1.39% 0.29% 0.16% 
Income: $10k - $30k 10.71% 2.95% 11.01% 6.63% 8.18% 7.94% 
Income: 30k – 50k 24.86% 31.23% 22.69% 24.57% 18.09% 29.55% 
Income: 50k – 80k 31.59% 27.93% 33.64% 31.94% 30.40% 32.80% 
Income: 80k – 150k 22.27% 30.35% 24.35% 28.77% 31.45% 22.50% 
Income: > 150k 9.78% 7.54% 7.29% 6.70% 11.59% 7.05% 
       
Owns home 73.92% 81.77% 77.88% 86.67% 78.97% 79.13% 
Does not own home 26.08% 18.23% 22.12% 13.33% 21.03% 20.87% 
Head of household is not white 14.66% 22.20% 16.75% 15.16% 22.89% 18.75% 
Head of household is white 85.34% 77.80% 83.25% 84.84% 77.11% 81.25% 
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 1995 SCF 1998 SCF 2001 SCF 
 No LoanHas a Loan No Loan Has a Loan No LoanHas a Loan
Married household 66.65% 75.65% 64.90% 68.09% 67.04% 67.30% 
Household has two earners 47.46% 63.57% 46.29% 52.89% 52.11% 49.53% 
       
Years of 401(k) plan participation 5.82 8.96 6.51 7.23 7.14 9.13 
Holds mostly stock in 401(k) plan 45.60% 36.45% 49.29% 49.03% 58.81% 61.81% 
Has defined benefit plan 26.59% 30.18% 24.90% 29.48% 27.10% 24.84% 
Does not have a defined benefit 
plan 73.41% 69.82% 75.10% 70.52% 72.90% 75.16% 
Has other account type pension 
plan 22.69% 34.22% 13.95% 16.74% 13.58% 13.51% 
Has an Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA) 33.27% 19.63% 38.45% 20.94% 43.69% 18.53% 
       
Has been turned for credit in 
prior five years 7.88% 15.14% 10.05% 16.33% 9.36% 22.47% 
Reason for saving: Child’s 
education 9.09% 11.21% 7.39% 7.26% 8.31% 6.47% 
Reason for saving: Precautionary 
motive 30.33% 19.11% 16.26% 16.25% 20.09% 18.97% 
Reason for saving: Retirement 36.11% 44.08% 51.23% 50.53% 44.11% 47.43% 
Savings horizon less than one 
year 8.22% 17.13% 10.39% 21.03% 11.20% 18.86% 
Savings horizon between one and 
ten years 72.56% 61.01% 66.77% 58.89% 62.83% 64.05% 
Savings horizon greater than ten 
years 19.23% 21.86% 22.83% 20.08% 25.97% 17.09% 
       
Willing to take substantial 
investment risk 4.08% 3.81% 5.98% 16.26% 6.23% 7.37% 
Willing to take above average 
investment risk 27.26% 22.01% 31.79% 36.07% 33.97% 24.47% 
Willing to take average 
investment risk 48.97% 44.58% 46.19% 31.44% 41.42% 47.20% 
Not willing to take any 
investment risk 19.68% 29.59% 16.05% 16.24% 18.38% 20.96% 
Expects to receive a bequest 19.90% 16.60% 20.05% 18.91% 20.30% 17.21% 
Leaving a bequest is very 
important 24.78% 29.15% 19.29% 21.08% 25.47% 28.33% 
Leaving a bequest is somewhat 
important 59.28% 48.68% 57.05% 61.64% 54.79% 54.44% 
Expects economy to perform 
worse in the next five years 15.29% 20.26% 25.59% 27.68% 35.24% 32.21% 
       
Industry: Agriculture 0.98% 0.00% 1.01% 0.00% 0.82% 0.02% 
Industry: Mining and 
construction 5.22% 7.18% 8.57% 3.62% 6.39% 6.00% 
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 1995 SCF 1998 SCF 2001 SCF 
 No LoanHas a Loan No Loan Has a Loan No LoanHas a Loan
Industry: Manufacturing 31.46% 29.23% 26.55% 37.13% 26.18% 41.55% 
Industry: Wholesale and retail 
trade 14.25% 4.61% 10.74% 14.83% 10.98% 13.58% 
Industry: Finance, insurance, real 
estate, repair services 13.90% 17.71% 16.90% 10.35% 18.63% 14.68% 
Industry: Transportation, 
communication, utilities, 
entertainment 
30.89% 34.39% 32.01% 30.80% 32.23% 20.84% 
Industry: Public administration, 
military 3.30% 6.88% 4.22% 3.27% 4.77% 3.34% 
Place of employment has less 
than 20 employees 8.33% 6.62% 12.25% 7.60% 12.29% 5.33% 
Place of employment has between 
20 and 500 employees 
29.81% 18.50% 30.28% 23.59% 31.23% 34.11% 
Place of employment has more 
than 500 employees 60.09% 74.84% 55.30% 65.50% 53.96% 58.64% 
 
 
With regards to the demographic and saver type variables there are a few—but not 
many—striking differences between the two groups for the whole sample period. Borrowers are 
slightly more concentrated in their thirties and forties. Borrowers, especially in 1995 and 1998, 
are more likely to be homeowners. For example, in 1995 82 percent of borrowers are 
homeowners compared with 74 percent of non-borrowers. Given the admonitions against 401(k) 
borrowing it seems that homeowners should first borrow against home equity before retirement 
savings; given that 33 percent of borrowers in their thirties and 26 percent of borrowers in their 
forties used the loan proceeds for their home or vacation property it’s possible that the loan was 
used as part of the down payment. With the exception of the length of the savings horizon, 
borrowers are not very different from non-borrowers with regards to their saver type. The 
groups are similar with regards to savings motives (children’s education, precautionary or 
retirement motive), attitudes toward risk (with the exception of 1995 when borrowers were more 
likely to not be willing to take on any financial risk), and attitudes towards bequests and their 
economic outlook. Non-borrowers have a longer savings horizon, as there is a larger 
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concentration (between and eight and eleven percent higher) of borrowers that have a savings 
horizon of less than one year compared to non-borrowers. 
Logit Model 
In order to estimate a model of the use loans against 401(k) plan assets I use a logit 
regression: 
Y = b0 + b1 X1 + … + bn Xn  + e       (1) 
where Y is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a household has a loan against 
their 401(k) plan and zero otherwise, X1 … Xn is a set of explanatory variables thought to be 
related to the loan decision such a demographic features and attitudes toward savings, and b0 … 
bn are a set of parameters to be estimated. Given the richness of the SCF there are a large 
number of explanatory variables that could be included in the estimation, with many of the 
variables likely to be highly correlated. Using a large number of correlated explanatory variables 
is likely to lead to parameter estimates that are of the wrong sign and / or have large standard 
errors that may lead to many insignificant parameter estimates (see R. Carter Hill and Lee C. 
Adkins (2001) and Peter Kennedy (1998, chapter 11) for a more complete discussion of the 
effects of using collinear explanatory variables). In an effort to avoid including too many 
collinear variables and to ensure a parsimonious model specification I use a testing down (also 
known as general-to-specific) methodology advocated by Kennedy (1998, chapter 5) or David F. 
Hendry (1993) and explained in appendix A. 
The 48 variables included in the general model and the results of this logit regression are 
in Panel A of table four. Twenty of these variables have t-statistics less than two. The results of 
the final, specific, model are reported in Panel B of table four. There are 16 explanatory variables 
(not including the intercept) in this model. 
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Table four: Results of logit estimation where the dependent variable is whether or not a 
household has a loan against their 401(k) plan 
 
Panel A: General Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-stat 
Intercept -3.85 .55 -7.05 
Savings horizon greater than 10 years -.80 .05 -17.79 
Has an IRA -.93 .09 -10.58 
Willing to take substantial investment risk .61 .06 10.28 
Was refused credit in previous five year .84 .08 10.08 
Industry: Manufacturing .79 .08 9.46 
Savings horizon 1 to 10 years -.68 .07 -9.11 
Industry: Public administration, military .66 .09 7.03 
Age: 40 - 49 1.52 .23 6.73 
Age: 30 - 39 1.68 .30 5.59 
Age: 50 - 59 1.27 .23 5.58 
Head of household is not white -.22 .04 -5.47 
Income: $10k - $30k -.69 .13 -5.28 
Education: Finished college -.53 .10 -5.27 
Industry: Transportation, communication, .55 .10 5.20 
Own home .47 .09 5.02 
Years of participation in 401(k) plan .06 .01 4.57 
Education: Graduate school -.42 .09 -4.43 
Place of employment greater than 500 employees .34 .08 4.14 
Age: Less than 30 1.29 .32 4.07 
Industry: Wholesale and retail trade .67 .17 4.00 
Reason for saving: retirement .17 .04 3.98 
Industry: Finance, insurance, real estate, repair services .54 .15 3.58 
Employer makes contribution to plan .16 .04 3.48 
Education: Some college -.27 .08 -3.16 
In 2001 SCF -.23 .07 -3.09 
Reason for saving: precautionary motive -.17 .07 -2.64 
Employee's contribution .00 .00 -2.63 
Willing to take average investment risk -.23 .09 -2.63 
Has other account type plan .19 .10 1.95 
Leaving a bequest is very important .12 .10 1.26 
Can also make withdrawals from plan .20 .17 1.20 
Income: $50k - $80k -.21 .18 -1.20 
Place of employment between 20 and 500 employees .14 .12 1.11 
Married .09 .09 1.02 
In 1998 SCF .06 .06 .95 
Reason for saving: child’s education -.17 .18 -.95 
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-stat 
Has a defined benefit plan -.05 .07 -.75 
Willing to take above average investment risk -.06 .08 -.70 
Ratio of debt to assets .00 .00 .68 
Ratio of debt to financial assets 6.72x-18 9.94 x-18 -.66 
Expects to receive a bequest -1.16 x-18 1.77 x-18 -.63 
Leaving a bequest is somewhat important .06 .10 .61 
Income: less than $10k -.19 .44 -.43 
Income: $30k - $50k .07 .17 .43 
Expects economy to perform worse in the next five years .03 .08 .40 
Both head of household and spouse work -.01 .04 -.28 
Income: $80k - $150k .03 .18 .17 
401(k) plan is invested mostly in stock .00 .03 -.04 
 
Panel B: Specific model 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-stat 
Marginal  
Effect 
Intercept -3.59 .41 -8.86  
Age < 30 1.21 .30 4.00  
Age: 30 – 39* 1.56 .29 5.29 4.07% 
Age: 40 – 49* 1.41 .23 6.24 -1.83% 
Age: 50 – 59* 1.12 .23 4.80 -3.10% 
Education: four years of college**** -.29 .08 -3.60 -3.06% 
Income: 30k – 50k**** .36 .07 4.99 4.26% 
Income: 80k – 150k**** .23 .10 2.19 2.60% 
Owns home**** .51 .07 7.60 4.99% 
Years in 401(k) plan** .06 .01 6.26 .69% 
Has an IRA**** -.89 .06 -13.91 -9.02% 
Household has another account type 
retirement plan**** .29 .11 2.64 3.40% 
Has been refused credit in prior five years**** .78 .09 9.12 10.64% 
Savings horizon from one to ten years*** -.62 .08 -8.14 -8.19% 
Savings horizon is greater than ten years*** -.73 .07 -11.05 -1.21% 
Industry: Manufacturing**** .31 .05 6.32 3.54% 
Place of employment has greater than 500 employees .26 .03 8.24 2.78% 
 
* Marginal effect should be read as the change in probability of having a loan as the head of 
household changes from the 20 to 30 year old age group, the 30 to 40 age group, and the 40 to 
50 age group. 
* *Marginal effect is approximately the increase in probability of having a loan as the household 
goes from 8 to 9 years of plan participation. 
***Marginal effects should be read as the change in probability of having a loan as the 
household changes from the base case of a savings horizon of less than one year to a savings 
horizon of between one and ten years and then as the household changes to a savings horizon 
greater than ten years. 
****Marginal effects should be read as the change in probability as of having an outstanding 
loan as the households switches from not being in the category to being in the category. 
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Since the logit model is not a linear model the coefficients cannot be considered marginal 
effects as in least squares. However the coefficients are easily transformed into probabilities by 
evaluating the cumulative density function (CDF) exp(xb)/[1+exp(xb)] where b are the 
estimates of the coefficients and x is a measure of the explanatory variables, usually the 
averages. Details of this methodology are included in appendix B.  
As a general conclusion it appears that households that might be poor savers, in that it 
might take a relatively high interest rate to induce them to defer consumption, are more likely to 
have an outstanding 401(k) plan loan. For example, the probability of having a loan is 
decreasing in both IRA status and savings horizon, both of which could be considered measures 
of saver type. For example, James Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise (1995) use IRA 
status to divide their sample into groups of like savers, the implication being that households 
that also have an IRA are likely to be better savers. This is a reasonable assumption since IRA 
participation is strictly voluntary and available to nearly all non-self employed workers. 
Households with short savings horizons may have a preference for current consumption rather 
than saving for the future, as suggested by Richard Ippolito (1997). Having an IRA decreases the 
probability of having an outstanding loan by 9 percent and households that increase their 
savings horizons from less than one year to between one and ten years decrease their chance of 
having an outstanding loan by over eight percent. A further increase in savings horizon to 
greater than ten years decreases the probability by and additional 1.21 percent. In addition, 
there is 10.64 percent increase in the probability of having a loan if the household had been 
refused credit in the five years prior to the survey year. Together with the higher debt-to-assets 
ratio for borrowers noted above in the descriptive statistics (although this ratio had an 
insignificant effect in the logit regressions), this suggests that households with 401(k) loans use 
other sources of credit besides to the 401(k) loan to a greater extent than households without 
such a loan outstanding. Note, however, it is not possible to determine the timing of the credit 
use i.e. whether or not the 401(k) loan was prior to the credit refusal and other credit use. In 
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addition, the positive coefficients on the Years of participation in the 401(k) plan and the Has 
other account type pension plan indicate that households may be choosing to borrow only after 
having a certain comfort level with their retirement savings situation, i.e. either sufficient assets 
needed for a loan. 
The Place of employment has greater than 500 employees variable has several possible 
interpretations. One is that the transaction costs associated with 401(k) borrowing is lower in 
larger firms; Edwin C. Husted (1998) finds that administrative costs of 401(k) plans are lower in 
larger firms. These lower costs might be passed to potential borrowers. A second interpretation 
is that employees in smaller firms may have a more personable relationship with people in the 
human resources department or their fellow employees who may be apt to discourage 
borrowing.39 I do not have a ready interpretation of the Industry: manufacturing variable 
expect perhaps as it might be related to the higher concentration of union members 
manufacturing firms; the administration of these plans may facilitate borrowing. The positive 
coefficients on the age group variables need to be understood in light of the omitted group being 
the over sixty age group, which has less than two percent of outstanding plan loans. The 
marginal effects are more meaningful as they express the change in probabilities as the 
household moves to an older age group. These probabilities decrease as a household moves from 
their thirties to forties and especially as a household moves from their forties to fifties. This is 
consistent with Christopher D. Carroll and Andrew A. Samwick (1997) and Christopher D. 
Carroll (2001) who find in simulations of consumption and savings behavior that households 
seem to be more concerned with saving for emergencies until about the age of 50, when the 
retirement savings motive takes precedence. 
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The Impact of 401(k) Borrowing on Retirement Wealth 
This section examines the impact that taking a loan against 401(k) assets might have on 
wealth at retirement. As in most of the other literature the assumption is that if the loan is not 
taken the funds are not obtained from another source, such as a home equity or finance 
company loan. For a different perspective see Jo Ann Pinto (2003) for an example that 
compares a 401(k) versus home equity loan decision. To evaluate the impact I compare the 
retirement wealth of an individual who takes a loan with wealth if a loan is not taken. I do so 
under a variety of scenarios regarding the loan amount, monthly contributions to the plan, loan 
interest rate, rate of return on the market, the age of the borrower, as well as considering the 
impact if the household suspends their regular contribution or not. Both Alicia H. Munnell and 
Annika Sunden (2004, pages 128 – 131) and the GAO (1997) examine the impact of borrowing 
only on pension wealth, but in a more limited fashion than here and they assume, as I do, that 
the funds are not borrowed from another source. For example, Munnell and Sunden consider 
one loan (at age 40 of half the account balance40, repaid over five years, with a single loan 
interest rate and market rate of return for the account assets). Their simulation shows that 
borrowers lose only one percent of their account balance if they maintain their contributions 
during the loan and up to 16 or 18 percent of their balance if they suspend contributions during 
the loan period, although they assume that income grows until retirement so contributions to 
the plan also grow. The GAO simulation is limited in that they only consider a return of 11 
percent on the account balance and a 35-year working life; they do not indicate the amount of 
the loan, the initial account balance, or the contributions to the pension account. As a percent of 
the no-loan balance, if the borrower does not suspend contributions the GAO reports notes that 
borrowers would lose from 6.4 percent of the no-loan account balance if the loan interest rate is 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
39 See Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez (2002) regarding the influence of colleagues on participation and 
investment decisions (though the paper does not mention borrowing against a retirement plan). 
40 Their loan is for half the account balance of $353,408, which would be not allowed since loans are limited to the 
smaller of $50,000 or half the account balance. 
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6.3 percent to 2.1 percent if the loan interest rate is 9.5 percent. If contributions are suspended 
during the loan period then the impact is a loss of 27.8 percent of the no-loan balance if the loan 
interest rate is 6.3 percent and a loss of 23.5 percent if the loan interest rate is 9.5 percent. Jo 
Ann M. Pinto (2003) finds that a 401(k) loan is slightly advantageous, although a limitation of 
Pinto’s work is that she only considers two interest rate scenarios.   
Determining the amount of retirement assets under the no-loan scenario is 
straightforward: It is the future value (at an assumed retirement age of 65) of initial retirement 
assets for a 35- or 45-year old plus the future value of contributions to the plan, using rates of 
return for retirement assets, which I vary from one to eleven percent. To determine retirement 
assets under to loan scenario, I subtract the loan amount and a $100 set up fee from the initial 
amount of retirement assets, assume the loan is repaid in equal monthly installments over a 
five-year term, with a yearly maintenance fee of $50, with the loan repayments credited directly 
to the account. I also account for the fact that loan proceeds are pre-tax dollars but loan 
payments are made with post-tax dollars by subtracting the difference between the pre-tax 
dollars needed for the loan payment and the loan payment41; this implicitly assumes that the 
difference in the pre- and post-tax dollars would have been placed in the retirement account. I 
vary the return on retirement assets from one to eleven percent and the loan interest rate from 
one to five percent; since I do not account for inflation these rates could be considered real 
returns. In addition, I assume no growth in wages so the contribution remains the same until 
retirement. 
The results of the simulation for a variety of scenarios are in table five42. Panels A and B 
report the impact of retirement wealth if the household maintains regular contributions to the 
                                                        
41 If the monthly loan payment is $LP then the pre-tax dollars needed for the loan payment is 
LP
t
$
1 -
, where t is the 
tax rate, assumed to be 30 percent. 
 
42 The limited numbers of scenarios reported here appear to capture the essential points of the effects of borrowing. 
Results for additional scenarios with regard to initial retirement assets, loan size, and monthly contribution are also 
available. 
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retirement account; panels C and D show the impact if the household suspends contributions 
during the loan term. Panels A and C report for 35 year olds; Panels B and D report on 45 year 
olds. Under each combination of return on retirement assets and loan interest rates (I’ve 
omitted scenarios where the loan interest rate is above the return on retirement assets) the 
impact of a loan is reported three ways. The first is retirement assets available (having taken out 
a loan) as a percentage of assets had the loan not been taken out; the second number is the 
number of years beyond the age of 65 a borrower would have to work and continue making the 
same dollar contributions to the plan in order to have the same amount of retirement assets had 
the loan not been taken out; the third number is the dollar amount a borrower would need to 
increase their monthly contribution after the five-year loan term in order to have the same 
amount of retirement assets had the loan not been taken. For example, in the first case of Panel 
A (age 35, maintains contributions during loan term, borrows $5,000, has a $25,000 account 
balance, with monthly contributions of $200) where the loan interest rate is the same as the 
return on the household’s, retirement assets will only be three percent less than if the loan had 
not been taken. If the household wished to have the same amount of retirement assets as if there 
had not been borrowing from the account, then they would need to either work an additional 1.4 
years beyond the assumed retirement age of 65, or they could increase their monthly 
contribution by ten dollars from the age of 40 (when the loan is paid back in full) to 65.43 
                                                        
43 I don’t make a distinction between an employee’s own contribution or an employer’s match. 
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Table five: Effects of borrowing against 401(k) plan: Row percentages are returns on assets in 
retirement account; column percentages are interest rates on loan. Under each row percentage 
is the ratio of retirement assets with a five-year loan to assets without a loan, the additional 
years of work needed to accumulate the same amount of assets had the loan not been taken, and 
the additional monthly contribution needed to achieve the account balance under the no-loan 
scenario 
Panel A: Age 35, maintains contributions during loan term 
$200 contribution, $25,000 balance, $5,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
 % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $ 
1% .97 1.4 $10  .96 2.6 $14  .96 4.5 $20  .95 7.3 $28  .94 10.7 $38  .93 14.1 $51 
3%     .97 2.4 $14  .96 4.3 $19  .95 7.1 $27  .94 10.4 $37  .94 13.8 $49 
5%         .96 4.1 $18  .95 6.8 $26  .95 10.1 $35  .94 13.5 $47 
                        
$200 contribution, $25,000 balance, $10,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
1% .95 2.6 $18  .93 4.7 $27  .92 7.8 $38  .90 11.7 $54  .89 15.6 $73  .87 19.0 $97 
3%     .94 4.4 $25  .92 7.5 $36  .91 11.3 $51  .89 15.3 $70  .88 18.7 $93 
5%         .93 7.1 $34  .91 10.9 $48  .90 14.9 $66  .88 18.4 $89 
                        
$500 contribution, $75,000 balance, $20,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
1% .96 2.0 $35  .95 3.7 $52  .94 6.3 $74  .93 9.8 $104  .92 13.6 $142  .91 17.1 $190 
3%     .95 3.5 $49  .94 6.0 $70  .93 9.5 $99  .92 13.3 $136  .92 16.8 $182 
5%         .95 5.7 $66  .94 9.1 $94  .93 12.9 $129  .92 16.4 $174 
                        
 
Panel B: Age 45, maintains contributions during loan term 
$200 contribution, $25,000 balance, $5,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
 % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $ 
1% .96 1.3 $16  .96 1.9 $21  .95 2.9 $28  .94 4.1 $36  .94 5.6 $46  .93 7.3 $59 
3%     .96 1.8 $20  .95 2.7 $26  .95 4.0 $34  .94 5.5 $44  .93 7.1 $57 
5%         .96 2.6 $25  .95 3.8 $33  .94 5.3 $42  .94 6.9 $55 
                        
$200 contribution, $25,000 balance, $10,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
1% .93 2.3 $29  .92 3.5 $39  .91 5.1 $52  .89 7.0 $68  .88 9.0 $88  .87 11.0 $113 
3%     .92 3.3 $37  .91 4.9 $49  .90 6.7 $65  .89 8.8 $84  .87 10.8 $108 
5%         .92 4.6 $47  .90 6.5 $62  .89 8.5 $80  .88 10.5 $104 
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$500 contribution, $75,000 balance, $20,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
1% .95 1.8 $56  .94 2.8 $76  .93 4.1 $101  .93 5.7 $132  .92 7.6 $172  .91 9.5 $220 
3%     .95 2.6 $71  .94 3.9 $95  .93 5.5 $126  .92 7.3 $164  .91 9.3 $211 
5%         .94 3.7 $90  .93 5.2 $119  .92 7.1 $156  .92 9.0 $202 
 
Panel C: Age 35, suspends contributions during loan term 
$200 contribution, $25,000 balance, $5,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
 % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $ 
1% .84 7.7 $56  .81 11.7 $76  .79 16.1 $100  .77 2 $129  .75 23.0 $164  .73 25.2 $205 
3%     .81 11.6 $75  .79 16.0 $99  .77 19.9 $128  .75 23.0 $162  .74 25.2 $204 
5%         .79 15.9 $98  .77 19.8 $126  .75 22.9 $161  .74 25.1 $202 
                        
$200 contribution, $25,000 balance, $10,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
1% .81 8.8 $65  .78 13.3 $88  .75 18.0 $118  .72 22.0 $154  .69 24.9 $199  .67 27.0 $252 
3%     .78 13.1 $87  .75 17.8 $116  .72 21.8 $152  .70 24.8 $195  .68 26.8 $248 
5%         .76 17.6 $114  .73 21.6 $149  .70 24.6 $192  .68 26.7 $244 
                        
$500 contribution, $75,000 balance, $20,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
1% .83 8.2 $151  .81 12.6 $205  .78 17.1 $272  .76 21.1 $356  .75 24.1 $456  .73 26.2 $576 
3%     .81 12.4 $202  .79 17.0 $268  .77 20.9 $350  .75 24.0 $450  .73 26.1 $568 
5%         .79 16.8 $264  .77 20.8 $345  .75 23.8 $443  .74 26.0 $560 
                        
Panel D: Age 45, suspends contributions during loan term 
$200 contribution, $25,000 balance, $5,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
 % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $  % yrs $ 
1% .79 7.0 $89  .77 9.1 $110  .76 11.2 $135  .75 13.2 $164  .73 14.9 $198  .72 16.3 $238 
3%     .78 9.0 $109  .76 11.1 $133  .75 13.1 $162  .74 14.9 $196  .73 16.2 $236 
5%         .76 11.0 $132  .75 13.0 $161  .74 14.8 $194  .73 16.2 $234 
                        
$200 contribution, $25,000 balance, $10,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
1% .76 8.0 $103  .74 10.4 $128  .72 12.7 $159  .70 14.8 $196  .68 16.5 $240  .66 17.9 $292 
3%     .74 10.2 $126  .72 12.6 $156  .70 14.7 $193  .68 16.4 $236  .67 17.8 $287 
5%         .73 12.4 $154  .71 14.5 $189  .69 16.3 $232  .67 17.6 $283 
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$500 contribution, $75,000 balance, $20,000 loan 
 1%  3%  5%  7%  9%  11% 
1% .79 7.5 $240  .77 9.7 $298  .76 12.0 $368  .74 14.1 $452  .73 15.8 $551  .72 17.2 $668 
3%     .78 9.6 $294  .76 11.9 $363  .75 14.0 $446  .74 15.7 $544  .73 17.1 $659 
5%         .77 11.7 $358  .75 13.8 $439  .74 15.6 $536  .73 17.0 $650 
 
If a household taking out a loan is able to maintain their monthly contributions during 
the loan term then the impact on retirement wealth is modest, with households unlikely to lose 
more than ten percent—less in most scenarios—of their retirement wealth. As would be expected 
the impact is greatest when the opportunity cost of the funds is greatest; that is, when the 
difference between the investment returns of the retirement assets and the loan interest rate is 
greatest. It is somewhat surprising then that percentage of households with an outstanding loan 
fell between 1998 and 2001, when, as a result of poor financial market performance leading to 
poor retirement asset performance, this opportunity cost was likely lower than prior to either of 
the 1995 or 1998 survey.44 When the opportunity cost of funds is high the impact on retirement 
assets can require a household more than ten additional years of work to replace the assets lost 
by taking out the loan. The number of years of additional work should be understood in the 
context of no make-up contributions being made. However, the scenarios assume either 15 or 25 
additional years of employment which leaves the household with plenty of time—assuming they 
have good savings habits—to replace the funds lost because of the loan.  
The importance of maintaining contributions during the loan term is highlighted by 
Panels C and D, which contain the same scenarios as in Panels A and B, but assume that 
contributions are suspended during the five-year loan term. In most of the cases for the 35 year 
old (Panel C) and all of the cases for the 45 year old, a household can expect to lose at least 
twenty, and in some cases more than thirty, percent of their retirement wealth as a result of the 
loan and suspending contributions. Except when the opportunity cost of funds is low, more than 
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ten years of additional work is required to have the equivalent no-loan balance. The scope for 
making up for the lost funds is probably limited as well. Although a household may have 15 or 25 
years to rebuild retirement wealth after the loan is repaid, the amount of make-up contributions 
needed is quite large, ranging from four to five times the amount of make-up contributions 
under the “maintain contributions” scenarios. Given the likelihood that households that suspend 
their contributions are in financial difficulty it is probably unrealistic to expect them to able to 
not only maintain their pre-loan contribution level, but then to also make additional 
contributions to their retirement accounts. If suspending contributions is a sign of financial 
difficulty then the figures in Panels C and D might represent a best-case scenario for these 
borrowers. Failure to make a loan payment would classify the loan as a withdrawal subject to 
ordinary income takes and, if the borrower is younger than 59 ½, the 10 percent IRS penalty. In 
this case the impact on retirement would be much greater than presented here, with the 
household likely losing more than 50 percent of its retirement wealth. 
Overall, it appears that the impact that borrowing has on retirement wealth can be quite 
modest, or even negligible, for individuals who are disciplined savers and have the wherewithal 
to increase their contributions after the loan is repaid. In fact, conditional on being disciplined 
about their financial matters, borrowing from a 401(k) plan is not an unwise choice since the 
loan interest is credited to the borrowers retirement account. However, borrowers who are 
undisciplined savers or who find themselves in financial difficulty can find themselves in worse 
financial shape if they take a loan against their retirement plan. 
Differences in Asset Accumulation 
In order to assess how savings behavior differs between households that have an 
outstanding loan at the time of the survey and those that do not, I use a difference-in-differences 
methodology. Eric M. Engen and William G. Gale (2000) and Karen Pence (2001), among 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
44 It’s possible that the full effects of the downturn were not apparent when the 2001 survey was conducted; it will 
be interesting to see if the next survey, conducted in 2004, will have an increase in the percentage of households 
with an outstanding loan. 
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others, have used this approach to determine whether 401(k) plan assets represent new savings 
by comparing asset accumulation over time between households eligible and ineligible for 
401(k) plans.45 The difference-in differences approach is well suited for analyzing a series of 
cross-sectional data such as the SCF and captures two differences: the differences between two 
groups and the differences across time (in this case borrowers and non-borrowers from 1995 to 
1998 and from 1995 to 2001) and is estimated by: 
i nl hl nl i nl hl nl i
nl nl
hl nl hl nl
W = HASLOAN X X HASLOAN
        SCF SCF
        SCF HASLOAN SCF HASLOAN
( ) * * ( )*( * )
* 98 * 01
( )*( 98 * ) ( )( 01 * )
a a a b b b
d g
d d g g e
+ - + + - +
+ +
- + - +
 (2) 
where Wi is a measure of wealth, the subscripts hl refers to households that have an outstanding 
loan and nl refers to households that do not have an outstanding loan, X is matrix of explanatory 
variables such as demographic features (age, education), pension coverage (defined benefit plan 
and IRA participation), and saver-type (savings horizon, risk tolerance, primary savings motive), 
HASLOAN is a dichotomous variable that equals one if a household has outstanding loan 
against their pension plan and zero otherwise, and SCF98 and SCF01 equal one if a household is 
in the 1998 or 2001 survey and zero otherwise. The key coefficients in (2) are 
hl nl( )d d- and hl nl( )g g- , which indicate the extent to which current borrowers’ wealth 
accumulation differs from non-borrowers. If current borrowers are saving less (more) than non-
borrowers then both coefficients should be negative (positive) with hl nl( )g g-  less than (greater 
than) hl nl( )d d- ; that is, borrowers’ wealth would have been decreasing (increasing) from 1995 
to 1998 relative to non-borrowers and decreasing (increasing) more so from 1995 to 2001. 
It is important in comparing the savings behavior of households to fully control for 
lifecycle effects. Households become wealthier as they become older. Ideally, I would like to able 
to track the savings behavior of the same individual over time, as in a panel data set. This is not 
possible using cross-sectional data like the SCF since different households participate in each 
                                                        
45 See Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (2000, Chapter 13) for a more detailed discussion and examples of this methodology. 
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survey. However, cohort analysis does allow me to examine life-cycle effects. For example, I can 
follow asset accumulation of 30 year olds in 1995, 33 year olds in 1998, and 36 year olds in 2001. 
As long as the characteristics of the cohorts do not change in successive cross sections then 
inferences can be made based on the behavior of cohorts. This should not be a concern in a 
nationally representative survey like the SCF since the changes in cohort characteristics reflect 
changes in the underlying population. I define four cohorts as follows. The less than 30 cohort 
contains households where the head of the household was less than 30 years old in 1995, less 
than 33 years old in 1998, and less than 36 years old in 2001. The 30 – 39 cohort consists of 
households where the cohort was 30 to 39 years old in 1995, 33 to 42 years old in 1998, and 36 
to 45 years old in 2001. The other two cohorts are similarly defined in ten-year increments 
based on their age in 1995: 40 to 49 and 50 to 59 years old46. The estimating equation 
accounting for cohort effects is: 
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where Cj,k is a dummy variable equaling one if the head of a household is in the kth of the four 
cohorts, and the other variables are defined as in (2). The key coefficients in (3), as in (2), are 
hl k nl k, ,( )d d- and hl k nl k, ,( )g g-  for each of the k cohorts which indicate the extent to which 
borrowers’ wealth is changing over time compared to non-borrowers within the same cohort. As 
described for the logit estimations, I use the testing down methodology to achieve a 
                                                        
46 I use ten-year increments so that there are a sufficient number of borrowing households in each cohort; in 
addition, there are an insufficient number of loans for the 60-year-old cohorts so I exclude this cohort from the 
analysis. 
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parsimonious model of explanatory and interaction (X*HASLOAN) variables, which should also 
reduce multi-collinearity problems that can result from using too many independent regressors. 
For the final estimations I include the SCFyear and SCFyear*HASLOAN variables in (2) and the 
Cohort, Cohort*SCFyear, Cohort*HASLOAN, and Cohort*HASLOAN*SCFyear variables in (3) 
regardless of whether they are eliminated by the testing down variable selection process. I do 
this because they are the key variables of interest; while this may result in a slight over fitting of 
the models it does not introduce bias in the models by including variables whose estimates are 
insignificantly different from zero. 
The dependent variables I use are 401(k) plan assets, retirement assets (401(k) plan and 
other defined contribution retirement account assets and IRAs), net financial assets (retirement 
assets plus stocks, bonds, brokerage, savings, and checking accounts) accounts, and net worth 
(financial assets, plus non-financial assets such as vehicles and more importantly, housing 
equity). Recall from table three that the means of these variables are much larger than the 
medians—an indication that a relatively few wealthy households have a large amount of these 
assets, while most households have much less. Since the distributions of these dependent 
variables are highly skewed, ordinary least square regressions are likely to suffer from 
heteroskedasticity. In addition, wealth data likely has several outliers. I take two approaches to 
these issues. As in much of the literature that investigates the savings effects of 401(k) plans (see 
James Porterba, Steven Venti, and David Wise (1995), Engen and Gale (2000), Pence (2001), 
and Daniel J. Benjamin (2003)) I use least absolute value (LAV) regression, a robust estimation 
procedure that is not as sensitive to outliers as OLS. LAV estimation is also called median 
regression since the estimates produce conditional medians rather than conditional means as in 
OLS.47 Another approach to a skewed dependent variable is to use its natural log. This is not 
necessarily desirable in this case as there are many non-positive observations for net financial 
assets and net worth. An alternative transformation is the inverse hyperbolic sine 
                                                        
47 See David Birkes and Yadolah Dodge (1993) for a more complete description and examples of LAV estimation 
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transformation (IHS), described by John B. Burbidge, Lonnie Magee, and A. Leslie Robb (1988), 
and used for SCF data by Arthur Kennickell and Annika Sunden (1997) as well as Karen Pence 
(2001). This transformation is symmetric around zero and approximates the natural logarithm 
for values away from zero. The IHS transformation of a variable, x, is 
x x1 2 2ln( ( 1)q q q- + +        (4) 
where q is a scaling parameter, whose optimal value can be found by a grid search of the 
concentrated log-likelihood function found in Burbidge, Magee, and Robb. Figures two and 
three show the level and transformed values of net financial assets used in this paper. The IHS 
transformation creates an approximately normal dependent variable48. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped using the resampling scheme provided by Federal Reserve and, following Pence, 
calculated using Moshe Buchinsky’s (1995) Design Matrix Bootstrap Estimator using the 
average of the parameter estimates of the bootstrap resamples as the pivotal vector in 
calculating the variance-covariance matrix. 
                                                        
48 The optimal q for net worth is .00000025, net financial assets is.00000057, retirement assets is .00000131, and 
401(k) assets is .00000291. 
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Figure two: Distribution of net financial assets 
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Figure three: Distribution of the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of net financial assets 
 
- 5500000 - 3500000 - 1500000 500000 2500000 4500000 6500000 8500000 10500000 12500000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
i znet f i n
 
 84
Savings Effects on Entire Sample 
The LAV parameter estimates are generally of the same sign and statistical significance 
of the OLS estimates, although the OLS estimates are a larger magnitude, reflecting that the 
conditional means are larger than the conditional medians. As there are few qualitative 
differences, in table six I report only the LAV estimates of (2) in order to limit the number of 
tables. The OLS estimates are available on request. The coefficients are generally larger for 
broader wealth measures; that is, the coefficients in the 401(k) asset specification are smaller 
than the in the net worth specification. The demographic and saver type variables generally have 
the expected signs and magnitudes. For example, all of the wealth measures are increasing in 
the 30-, 40-, and 50-year-old age groups and in the two highest income groups that appear in 
the final models49. Completing graduate school is a positive and significant factor in determining 
401(k) and retirement assets, although not for net financial assets or net worth. Households 
with two earners have markedly less wealth than households without two earners; the LAV 
coefficient in the net worth specification is –57,876, which seems quite large considering that 
median net worth in 2001 was $171,700 for non-borrowers and $100,270 for borrowers. Two 
possible explanations are that households with less wealth desire the additional consumption a 
second income provides or that households with two earners are saving less in anticipation of 
increasing asset accumulation at a later point in the lifecycle. The variables that proxy for saver 
type also have positive coefficients. For example, being an IRA participant is positive and 
significant across the specifications, as is years of participation in a 401(k) plan. Households 
that have their 401(k) assets mostly in stock have a larger amount of 401(k) assets, although this 
isn’t surprising considering the stock market boom that occurred during much of the sample 
period (1995 to 2001). 
                                                        
49 The negative signs for the age group variables are because the omitted group is the age-60 group. 
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Table six: Least Absolute Value regression results for determining the differences in saving 
behavior between households that have a loan against their 401(k) plan and those that do not 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is the level and IHS transformation of 401(k) plan assets 
 
 Level of 401(k) plan assets  IHS transform of 401(k) plan assets 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat 
Intercept -9,525 4,487 -2.12  1,981 556 3.56 
Has loan -10,691 5,130 -2.08  1,996 946 2.11 
In 1998 SCF 2,282 1,409 1.62  144 263 0.55 
In 2001 SCF 60 1,479 0.04  -323 326 -0.99 
In 1998 SCF * has loan 6,222 3,288 1.89   837 941 0.89 
In 2001 SCF * has loan 3,418 3,092 1.11   796 718 1.11 
Age: Less than 30 -2,565 4,443 -0.58  -2,198 580 -3.79 
Age: 30 – 39 -5,097 4,499 -1.13  -1,566 541 -2.89 
Age: 40 – 49 -4,282 4,266 -1.00  -1,220 541 -2.26 
Age: 50 – 59 -2,080 4,326 -0.48  -1,392 544 -2.56 
Education: Graduate school 5,203 1,194 4.36  1,317 339 3.88 
Income: 80k – 150k 9,724 1,360 7.15  3,106 291 10.68 
Income: > 150k 57,188 6,464 8.85  9,831 465 21.15 
Household has two earners -2,566 918 -2.79  -1,182 198 -5.98 
Savings horizon greater than 
ten years 2,943 1,114 2.64  784 217 3.61 
Willing to take average 
investment risk 1,918 791 2.43  526 149 3.54 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation 5,016 258 19.45  827 25 33.52 
Holds mostly stock in 401(k) 
plan 3,414 1,039 3.29  867 136 6.39 
Has an IRA 2,065 1,011 2.04  1,157 222 5.21 
Place of employment has 
between 20 and 500 
employees 2,677 1,734 1.54  827 272 3.04 
Place of employment has 
more than 500 employees 4,921 1,673 2.94  1,186 274 4.34 
Industry: Transportation, 
communication, utilities, 
entertainment -1,528 962 -1.59  -267 215 -1.24 
Household has two earners * 
has loan 7,928 4,352 1.82  433 713 0.61 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation * has loan 85 725 0.12  -257 63 -4.05 
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Panel B: Dependent variable is the level and IHS transformation of retirement assets 
 
 Level of retirement assets  IHS transform of retirement assets 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat 
Intercept 27,361 24,739 1.11  9,314 1,945 4.79 
Has loan -2,915 6,476 -0.45  3,056 1,211 2.52 
In 1998 SCF 2,034 1,656 1.23  221 362 0.61 
In 2001 SCF 638 2,168 0.29  -144 520 -0.28 
In 1998 SCF * has loan 486 5,339 0.09   -341 1,304 -0.26 
In 2001 SCF * has loan 946 5,316 0.18   630 1,167 0.54 
Age: Less than 30 -35,440 24,994 -1.42  -7,923 1,839 -4.31 
Age: 30 – 39 -40,371 25,126 -1.61  -7,237 1,816 -3.98 
Age: 40 – 49 -36,840 25,070 -1.47  -4,881 1,761 -2.77 
Age: 50 – 59 -29,814 24,584 -1.21  -4,541 1,699 -2.67 
Education: Graduate school 12,276 2,682 4.58  2,955 466 6.34 
Income: 80k – 150k 23,689 2,980 7.95  7,232 644 11.22 
Income: > 150k 176,212 16,210 10.87  29,629 1,326 22.34 
Household has two earners -3,876 1,536 -2.52  -2,172 368 -5.91 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation 5,185 535 9.70  1,152 40 28.51 
Has other account type 
pension plan 8,979 686 13.09  3,146 538 5.84 
Has an IRA 27,942 2,883 9.69  8,928 343 26.05 
Income: > 150k * has loan -36,670 34,130 -1.07  -11,456 4,570 -2.51 
Household has two earners * 
has loan 8,840 3,151 2.81  769 1,323 0.58 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation * has loan -466 891 -0.52  -254 93 -2.74 
Panel C: Dependent variable is the level and IHS transformation of net financial assets 
 Level of net financial assets  IHS transform of net financial assets 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat 
Intercept 76,747 39,232 1.96  21,483 3,649 5.89 
Has loan -12,424 6,156 -2.02  -2,569 2,279 -1.13 
In 1998 SCF 8,575 3,430 2.50  3,439 1,054 3.26 
In 2001 SCF 5,377 3,824 1.41  631 1,149 0.55 
In 1998 SCF * has loan -3,761 10,679 -0.35   -5,742 2,561 -2.24 
In 2001 SCF * has loan -9,871 7,277 -1.36   -1,618 3,319 -0.49 
Age: Less than 30 -91,105 39,723 -2.29  -21,481 3,683 -5.83 
Age: 30 – 39 -95,568 41,426 -2.31  -18,906 3,680 -5.14 
Age: 40 – 49 -88,630 40,515 -2.19  -13,912 3,437 -4.05 
Age: 50 – 59 -68,550 44,842 -1.53  -10,339 3,488 -2.96 
 47,802 5,749 8.31  19,962 1,514 13.18 
Income: 80k – 150k 483,975 39,469 12.26  77,215 4,083 18.91 
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 Level of net financial assets  IHS transform of net financial assets 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat 
Income: > 150k -16,876 3,545 -4.76  -8,600 1,086 -7.92 
Household has two earners 6,524 655 9.96  1,887 82 22.91 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation 14,800 3,890 3.80  7,456 1,526 4.89 
Has other account type 
pension plan 62,900 6,103 10.31  22,534 1,342 16.79 
Has an IRA -286,412 53,887 -5.32  -21,128 6,782 -3.12 
Income: > 150k * has loan 76,747 39,232 1.96  21,483 3,649 5.89 
 
Panel D: Dependent variable is the level and IHS transformation of net worth 
 Level of net worth  IHS transform of net worth 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error T-Stat 
Intercept 152,328 77,469 1.97  52,522 5,731 9.17 
Has loan -20,136 9,835 -2.05  -9,816 4,435 -2.21 
In 1998 SCF 10,252 6,507 1.58  4,292 3,070 1.40 
In 2001 SCF 17,289 8,225 2.10  3,776 2,408 1.57 
In 1998 SCF * has loan -3,164 12,860 -0.25   -1,412 6,096 -0.23 
In 2001 SCF * has loan -21,488 15,079 -1.42   -4,646 4,960 -0.94 
Age: Less than 30 -160,204 78,021 -2.05  -38,175 5,235 -7.29 
Age: 30 – 39 -165,041 78,828 -2.09  -34,487 5,843 -5.90 
Age: 40 – 49 -137,678 78,826 -1.75  -19,684 5,140 -3.83 
Age: 50 – 59 -101,373 80,353 -1.26  -12,379 5,726 -2.16 
Income: 80k – 150k 107,553 8,303 12.95  35,926 2,220 16.18 
Income: > 150k 1,082,420 102,078 10.60  180,419 10,506 17.17 
Married 49,938 9,928 5.03  19,427 1,878 10.34 
Household has two earners -57,876 11,201 -5.17  -20,246 1,679 -12.06 
Leaving a bequest is very 
important 8,833 4,793 1.84  6,932 1,893 3.66 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation 8,461 953 8.88  2,781 175 15.91 
Has defined benefit pension 
plan 9,479 7,468 1.27  5,618 2,650 2.12 
Has an IRA 109,932 9,206 11.94  35,065 1,789 19.60 
Income: > 150k * has loan -781,541 134,246 -5.82  -93,102 16,587 -5.61 
 
The coefficients on the SCF98*HASLOAN and SCF01*HASLOAN interaction terms 
indicate the extent to which borrowers’ wealth is changing relative to non-borrowers. With the 
exception of the IHS transformation of retirement assets for 1998, the signs in the 401(k) and 
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retirement assets specifications are positive though insignificant, and in no case is the 
SCF01*HASLOAN coefficient larger than the SCF98*HASLOAN coefficient. Compared to 
households that do not have a loan against their retirement borrowers were neither increasing 
nor decreasing their retirement wealth from 1995 to 2001. Recall that 92 percent of households 
maintain their contributions during the loan period, so it is perhaps not surprising that 
households would be maintaining their retirement savings programs. The coefficients in the net 
financial assets and net worth specifications are negative, though only the coefficient for 
SCF98*HASLOAN in the IHS transformation of net financial assets is significantly different 
from zero. Except for this case, the SCF01*HASLOAN coefficients are less than the 
SCF98*HASLOAN coefficients indicating that borrowers have been decreasing their wealth 
relative to non-borrowers from 1998 to 2001, although these differences are not large enough to 
be statistically significant50. 
Results within Cohorts 
The results of estimating (3) are in tables seven and eight. I report the median regression 
parameter estimates for the demographic and saver type variables in table seven and the asset 
accumulation attributable to having an outstanding loan within the cohorts for both the OLS 
and LAV estimations in table eight. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients for the 
demographic and saver type variables are consistent with the results presented above. For 
example, the estimates for the savings effect of being in the two highest income groups are both 
positive with the over $150,000 coefficient larger than $80,000 to $150,000 income group 
coefficient. As with the earlier results, the coefficients for the same variables are larger for the 
broader wealth measures. For example, the median household that has an IRA has $1,418 more 
in 401(k) assets, $28,681 more in retirement assets, $59,587 more of net financial assets, and 
                                                        
50 The t-statistic for testing whether the SCF01*HASLOAN and SCF98*HASLOAN coefficients are significantly 
different from each other is 
SCF01*has loan SCF98*has loan SCF01*has loan,SCF98*has loanSCF01*has loan-SCF01*has loan + +2
2 2 2s s s  
where s2 indicates the variance or covariance of the parameter estimates. 
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$103,787 more net worth than the median household without an IRA. As with the sample above 
that did not use cohort analysis, there are few demographic / saver type interaction terms that 
appear in the final set of variables in the regressions, suggesting that there are few factors that 
explain the differences between the wealth of borrowers and non-borrowers. The Income 
greater than $150,000 * HASLOAN interaction term appears in three of the four specifications; 
the coefficients in the net financial assets and net worth specifications are both negative and 
significantly different from zero. No other interaction terms appear in the net financial assets or 
net worth specifications in either the full or cohort estimations. 
 
Table seven: Least Absolute Value regression results for determining the differences in saving 
behavior between households that currently have a loan against their 401(k) plan and those that 
do not. Panels A through D contain the demographic and saver type variables. (Note: the key 
coefficients for determining the savings effect among current borrowers are reported in table 
eight) 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is the level and IHS transformation of 401(k) plan assets 
 
 Level of 401(k) plan assets  IHS transform of 401(k) plan assets 
 Coeff. Standard 
Error 
T-Stat  Coeff. Standard 
Error 
T-Stat 
Intercept -10,848 15,806 -0.69  1,419 647 2.19 
Has loan -5,649 15,872 -0.36  3,720 1,826 2.04 
Education: Finished college 3,557 4,089 0.87  735 243 3.03 
Education: Graduate school 6,056 5,347 1.13  1,814 285 6.36 
Income: 80k – 150k 9,837 7,751 1.27  2,781 257 10.82 
Income: > 150k 55,838 33,725 1.66  9,576 564 16.97 
Household has two earners -1,076 6,470 -0.17  -1,037 200 -5.20 
Savings horizon: Greater than 10 
years 2,631 5,272 0.50  709 179 3.96 
Willing to take average 
investment risk 1,541 4,402 0.35  457 158 2.89 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation 5,025 1,869 2.69  804 27 29.31 
Holds mostly stock in 401(k) 
plan 3,089 2,950 1.05  919 172 5.33 
Has an IRA 1,418 3,121 0.45  1,297 214 6.06 
Place of employment has more 
than 500 employees 2,873 3,647 0.79  562 163 3.44 
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 Level of 401(k) plan assets  IHS transform of 401(k) plan assets 
 Coeff. Standard Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Standard Error T-Stat 
Industry: Transportation, 
communication, utilities, 
entertainment 
-1,668 5,344 -0.31  -377 176 -2.14 
Industry: Public administration, 
military -3,117 9,369 -0.33  -1,012 372 -2.72 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation * has loan -267 1,243 -0.21  -302 85 -3.53 
Has an IRA * has loan 5,421 9,969 0.54  -800 615 -1.30 
Industry: Public administration, 
military * has loan 2,398 36,449 0.07  1,021 958 1.07 
        
Cohort: Less than 30 642 6,747 0.10  -1,498 637 -2.35 
Cohort: 30 – 39 -2,658 5,331 -0.50  -756 607 -1.24 
Cohort: 40 – 49 -3,080 6,228 -0.49  -61 530 -0.11 
Cohort: Less than 30 * has loan 2,881 11,908 0.24  1,514 3,593 0.42 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * has loan 1,383 13,211 0.10  -40 1,629 -0.02 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * has loan -1,012 16,646 -0.06  -2,655 1,610 -1.65 
Cohort: Less than 30 * SCF98 -830 3,220 -0.26  430 422 1.02 
Cohort: Less than 30 * SCF 01 -2,401 4,014 -0.60  530 409 1.30 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * SCF98 3,167 3,266 0.97  431 424 1.02 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * SCF01 64 3,678 0.02  161 461 0.35 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * SCF98 4,635 4,382 1.06  85 374 0.23 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * SCF01 3,117 8,221 0.38  -798 564 -1.42 
Cohort: 50 – 59 * SCF98 2,778 12,643 0.22  484 545 0.89 
Cohort: 50 – 59 * SCF01 1,860 13,946 0.13  -535 838 -0.64 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is the level and IHS transformation of retirement assets 
 
 Level of Retirement Assets  IHS transform of Retirement assets 
 Coeff. Standard Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Standard Error T-Stat 
Intercept -6,863 11,385 -0.60  5,428 816 6.65 
Has loan -8,513 30,131 -0.28  2,823 1,731 1.63 
Education: Graduate school 11,391 7,102 1.60  2,692 637 4.22 
Income: 80k – 150k 21,463 10,381 2.07  6,906 448 15.40 
Income: > 150k 175,884 41,396 4.25  28,040 1,336 20.98 
Household has two earners -3,091 13,181 -0.23  -2,340 332 -7.06 
Foresee child’s education as a 
major expense 3,234 6,359 0.51 
 752 378 1.99 
Expect to receive a bequest 4,912 7,000 0.70  1,336 415 3.22 
Years of 401(k) plan participation 5,077 2,059 2.47  1,125 53 21.26 
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 Level of Retirement Assets  IHS transform of Retirement assets 
 Coeff. Standard Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Standard Error T-Stat 
Has other account type pension 
plan 
8,543 16,362 0.52  3,184 595 5.35 
Has an IRA 28,681 11,455 2.50  8,521 376 22.63 
Income: > 150k * has loan -33,284 49,664 -0.67  -10,165 4,914 -2.07 
Household has two earners * has 
loan 7,442 12,105 0.61 
 1,260 1,361 0.93 
Years of 401(k) plan participation 
* has loan -348 1,261 -0.28 
 -280 103 -2.70 
        
Cohort: Less than 30 -778 21,130 -0.04  -4,822 878 -5.49 
Cohort: 30 – 39 -6,423 22,812 -0.28  -4,085 910 -4.49 
Cohort: 40 – 49 -4,686 23,888 -0.20  -226 960 -0.24 
Cohort: Less than 30 * has loan 10,429 17,271 0.60  7,058 8,800 0.80 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * has loan 5,852 36,531 0.16  1,357 1,850 0.73 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * has loan 2,329 33,697 0.07  -4,354 2,338 -1.86 
Cohort: Less than 30 * SCF98 24 7,145 0.00  1,191 650 1.83 
Cohort: Less than 30 * SCF 01 -5,332 5,643 -0.94  1,079 583 1.85 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * SCF98 401 5,477 0.07  1,768 721 2.45 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * SCF01 -636 6,077 -0.10  1,145 531 2.16 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * SCF98 4,766 5,823 0.82  -986 786 -1.25 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * SCF01 11,483 16,866 0.68  -997 1,555 -0.64 
Cohort: 50 – 59 * SCF98 11,708 16,988 0.69  1,623 1,692 0.96 
Cohort: 50 – 59 * SCF01 31,618 25,463 1.24  2,887 2,168 1.33 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable is the level and IHS transformation of net financial assets 
 Level of net financial assets  IHS transform of net financial assets 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-Stat 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-Stat 
Intercept -1,102 20,657 -0.05  13,561 2,730 4.97 
Has loan -10,485 33,405 -0.31  -2,186 11,422 -0.19 
Income: 80k – 150k 48,501 27,237 1.78  19,889 1,314 15.14 
Income: > 150k 494,805 174,836 2.83  76,633 4,237 18.09 
Household has two earners -14,154 46,340 -0.31  -7,638 1,073 -7.12 
Holds mostly stock in 401(k) 
plan 6,353 2,908 2.18 
 1,904 102 18.74 
Has an IRA 59,587 32,332 1.84  22,135 1,087 20.36 
Income: > 150k * has loan -290,812 117,479 -2.48  -19,431 6,500 -2.99 
        
Cohort: Less than 30 -8,072 23,295 -0.35  -12,375 3,291 -3.76 
Cohort: 30 – 39 -11,385 27,805 -0.41  -13,086 2,677 -4.89 
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 Level of net financial assets  IHS transform of net financial assets 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-Stat 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-Stat 
Cohort: 40 – 49 -8,396 26,593 -0.32  -4,030 2,474 -1.63 
Cohort: Less than 30 * has 
loan 39,626 51,266 0.77 
 29,407 15,027 1.96 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * has loan 2,323 41,906 0.06  6,762 11,920 0.57 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * has loan -4,999 38,126 -0.13  -5,858 13,347 -0.44 
Cohort: Less than 30 * SCF98 2,694 14,825 0.18  2,947 2,487 1.19 
Cohort: Less than 30 * SCF 01 -8,160 14,706 -0.55  904 2,159 0.42 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * SCF98 6,771 15,444 0.44  9,428 1,847 5.10 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * SCF01 2,383 16,959 0.14  4,666 1,603 2.91 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * SCF98 15,412 24,755 0.62  3,245 1,633 1.99 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * SCF01 21,064 59,179 0.36  -15 2,084 -0.01 
Cohort: 50 – 59 * SCF98 33,729 71,100 0.47  3,915 4,572 0.86 
Cohort: 50 – 59 * SCF01 125,377 48,463 2.59  10,505 2,992 3.51 
 
Panel D: Dependent variable is the level and IHS transformation of net worth 
 Level of 401(k) plan assets  IHS transform of 401(k) plan assets 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-Stat 
 Coefficient Standard Error T-Stat 
Intercept 55,946 47,005 1.19  47,902 5,559 8.62 
Has loan -60,490 73,992 -0.82  -12,776 14,193 -0.90 
Income: 80k – 150k 107,555 52,640 2.04  33,170 1,852 17.91 
Income: > 150k 1,096,871 363,834 3.01  173,950 10,255 16.96 
Married 50,604 58,724 0.86  18,494 2,038 9.07 
Household has two earners -58,140 116,082 -0.50  -18,620 2,715 -6.86 
Leaving a bequest is very 
important 9,883 78,721 0.13 
 5,469 1,848 2.96 
Years of 401(k) plan 
participation 8,596 4,537 1.89 
 2,525 165 15.33 
Has a defined benefit plan 9,530 71,745 0.13  4,646 3,652 1.27 
Has an IRA 103,787 29,020 3.58  31,753 1,845 17.21 
Income: > 150k * has loan -763,600 218,407 -3.50  -87,119 15,298 -5.69 
        
Cohort: Less than 30 -61,927 46,490 -1.33  -33,380 6,972 -4.79 
Cohort: 30 – 39 -72,408 48,697 -1.49  -34,446 7,553 -4.56 
Cohort: 40 – 49 -36,339 48,513 -0.75  -6,434 6,844 -0.94 
Cohort: Less than 30 * has 
loan 121,511 91,155 1.33 
 54,627 25,160 2.17 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * has loan 51,761 79,339 0.65  18,166 14,291 1.27 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * has loan 10,029 88,151 0.11  -10,284 12,467 -0.82 
Cohort: Less than 30 * SCF98 4,082 43,321 0.09  1,583 4,273 0.37 
Cohort: Less than 30 * SCF 01 1,338 30,093 0.04  8,239 4,368 1.89 
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Cohort: 30 – 39 * SCF98 20,824 28,473 0.73  17,007 4,582 3.71 
Cohort: 30 – 39 * SCF01 24,528 24,741 0.99  13,851 3,474 3.99 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * SCF98 21,993 54,212 0.41  3,645 3,775 0.97 
Cohort: 40 – 49 * SCF01 45,882 105,765 0.43  4,020 5,190 0.77 
Cohort: 50 – 59 * SCF98 12,394 129,981 0.10  -1,958 6,907 -0.28 
Cohort: 50 – 59 * SCF01 145,670 170,425 0.85  15,753 4,919 3.20 
        
        
 
Table eight: Summary of savings behavior via LAV estimation within cohorts of households with a 
loan against their 401(k) plan and households without a loan. 
SCF98*HasLoan (SCF01*Has Loan) indicates the amount of assets attributable 
to borrowing from 1995 to 1998 (2001) 
 
Panel A: Dependent variables: 401(k) and retirement assets 
 
 Level of 401(k) assets 
 
IHS transformation 
of 401(k) assets  
Level of 
retirement assets  
IHS 
transformation 
of retirement assets 
 Coeff. Std. Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Std. Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Std. Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Std. Error T-Stat 
SCF98 
* Has 
loan 
1,374 7,128 0.19   -1,992 3,387 -0.59  -13,662 18,364 -0.74   -8,497 8,861 -0.96 
C
oh
or
t:
 
<
 3
0
 
SCF01 
* Has 
loan 
-710 6,739 -0.11   -2,203 3,205 -0.69  -3,448 21,212 -0.16   -8,171 9,103 -0.90 
                 
SCF98 
* Has 
loan 
4,922 9,153 0.54   -476 1,377 -0.35  2,928 14,818 0.20   -949 1,780 -0.53 
C
oh
or
t:
 
30
 –
 3
9 
SCF01 
* Has 
loan 
-2,156 9,368 -0.23   -772 1,336 -0.58  -1,853 15,037 -0.12   509 1,730 0.29 
                 
SCF98 
* Has 
loan 
13,568 12,219 1.11   2,518 765 3.29  13,401 13,490 0.99   4,183 3,130 1.34 
C
oh
or
t:
 
40
 –
 4
9 
SCF01 
* Has 
loan 
18,817 13,876 1.36   4,007 891 4.50  3,379 18,757 0.18   5,909 3,163 1.87 
                 
SCF98 
* Has 
loan 
17,669 20,459 0.86   543 1,625 0.33  4,302 33,342 0.13   -51 2,479 -0.02 
C
oh
or
t:
 
50
 –
 5
9 
SCF01 
* Has 
loan 
2,911 120,153 0.02   522 6,118 0.09  -23,054 121,630 -0.19   -2,653 12,636 -0.21 
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Panel B: Dependent Variables: net financial assets and net worth 
    
                
 Level of net financial 
assets 
 
IHS 
Transformation 
of net financial 
assets 
 
 Level 
of net worth  
IHS 
transformation 
of net worth 
 Coeff. Std. Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Std. Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Std. Error T-Stat 
 Coeff. Std. Error T-Stat 
SCF98 
* Has 
loan 
-51,703 28,207 -1.83   -33,876 17,678 -1.92  -99,290 52,816 -1.88   -48,353 23,679 -2.04 
C
oh
or
t:
 
<
 3
0
 
SCF01 
* Has 
loan 
-34,427 32,667 -1.05   -31,635 16,866 -1.88  -73,444 100,030 -0.73   -55,621 31,420 -1.77 
                 
SCF98 
* Has 
loan 
-342 29,992 -0.01   -12,407 5,609 -2.21  15,509 37,973 0.41   -6,351 11,021 -0.58 
C
oh
or
t:
 
30
 –
 3
9 
SCF01 
* Has 
loan 
-22,507 30,492 -0.74   -9,418 3,839 -2.45  -45,736 55,105 -0.83   -20,687 6,997 -2.96 
                 
SCF98 
* Has 
loan 
-7,787 35,732 -0.22   -1,699 7,449 -0.23  14,134 83,004 0.17   10,671 10,026 1.06 
C
oh
or
t:
 
40
 –
 4
9
 
SCF01 
* Has 
loan 
-13,121 67,628 -0.19   6,411 5,348 1.20  -9,664 107,462 -0.09   12,610 7,484 1.69 
                 
SCF98 
* Has 
loan 
-8,752 68,291 -0.13   4,085 14,755 0.28  11,517 123,980 0.09   2,736 17,723 0.15 
C
oh
or
t:
 
50
 –
 5
9
 
SCF01 
* Has 
loan 
-125,388 263,199 -0.48   -7,466 24,358 -0.31  -144,928 741,025 -0.20   -12,441 38,237 -0.33 
 
The cohort effects indicate that wealth is highest for the 50 – 60 year old cohort (the 
omitted group) as both the 40 – 50 and 30 – 40 cohort signs are both negative, with the 40 – 50 
cohort coefficient less than 30 – 40 cohort. The main focus of this section are the 
Cohort*SCF98*HASLOAN and the Cohort*SCF01*HASLOAN coefficients which indicate the 
extent to which savings behavior within the four cohorts differs between current borrowers and 
current non-borrowers from 1995 to 2001 and which can be attributed to a borrowing effect. 
Specifically, current borrowers are saving more (less) than non-borrowers if the 
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Cohort*SCF01*HASLOAN coefficient is larger (smaller) than the Cohort*SCF98*HASLOAN 
coefficient and both are positive (negative).  Most of the pairs of coefficients are inconsistent 
with increased asset accumulation by one group relative to the other so it is not possible to reach 
a broad conclusion regarding the savings behavior of borrowers compared to non-borrowers. It 
appears that households that have an outstanding loan are decreasing their holdings of net 
financial assets and net worth but are maintaining their 401(k) and retirement assets. In fact, 
the 40 – 49 cohort of borrowers has been increasing its 401(k) assets relative to the non-
borrowers in this cohort since 1995, although none of the differences in the cohort specifications 
are significantly different from zero, tested using the test statistic explained in footnote 25. This 
is an important cohort because this is the group that is making the transition from being 
precautionary to retirement savers. Together with the generally weaker financial condition of 
current borrowers may mean that this group has an incentive to maintain their retirement 
saving in order to provide for an adequate retirement. For the other dependent variables, it 
seems that borrowers are decreasing their holdings of net financial assets and net worth. The 
LAV estimation with the level of net financial assets as the dependent variable indicates that 
current borrowers have been decreasing their holdings of net financial assets relative to non-
borrowers. Nearly all of the Cohort*SCFyear*HASLOAN coefficients in the net financial assets 
specification and many in the net worth specification are negative; it’s just that the 
Cohort*SCF01*HASLOAN coefficient is usually not more negative than the 
Cohort*SCF98*HASLOAN coefficient so it is not possible to make a strong conclusion regarding 
the savings behaviors of borrowers compared to non-borrowers51. Although the evidence is weak 
at best, it seems that borrowers are trying to maintain good retirement savings behaviors while 
letting their net financial assets and net worth situations becoming worse over time. It’s unclear 
whether these are conscious or unconscious decisions. As many people feel that financial 
                                                        
51 Ten of the pairs of coefficients in the net financial assets and net worth specifications are consistent with 
borrowers’ dissaving relative to non-borrowers, while only one pair suggests that borrowers are saving more. 
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decisions are very complex, it may be that current borrowers understand the conventional 
wisdom about the dangers of borrowing against their retirement assets as they are trying to 
maintain their retirement wealth. However, they may be doing so at the expense of the net 
financial assets and / or housing equity (the major non financial component of net worth). This 
is probably less of a conscious decision. Given the tax advantages that retirement funds enjoy 
and the penalty for early withdrawal of assets from retirement accounts this may be a reasonable 
behavior for households in need of funds but who also have a desire to maintain a retirement 
savings goals. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Most personal finance advice warns against borrowing against a retirement plan because 
of the potential negative impact on retirement wealth. This is especially true for borrowers who 
are also undisciplined savers and do not or cannot maintain their retirement plan contributions 
during loan period or who separate from their employers before the loan is repaid. For good 
savers a retirement plan loan only has a modest impact on retirement wealth. Only modest 
make-up contributions would need to be made to mitigate the impact of a retirement plan loan. 
It seems that many borrowers may be using retirement loans because they are in financial 
difficulty. It also appears that borrowers are trying to maintain their retirement savings, but may 
be undermining overall savings behavior by not maintaining the financial assets. Retirement 
plan designers and policy makers face difficult choices regarding whether to allow borrowing 
from retirement plans. On one hand, allowing access to funds before retirement may increase 
participation rates, especially for younger savers for whom retirement is 20 or 30 years away. 
On the other hand, poor savers may find themselves tempted to use retirement savings to fund 
current consumption expenditures, which can seriously erode their wealth at retirement. 
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Appendix A: Missing values in the Survey of Consumer Finances 
Karen Pence (2000) and Arthur B. Kennickell (1998) note that missing values in a survey 
dealing with wealth questions are likely to be substantial. For example, households may be 
reluctant to provide information on certain assets, or may not know the value of others (i.e. 
business or real estate investment). The SCF tries to minimize this additional source of error by 
using Multiple Imputation (MI). See C.P. Montalto and J. Sung (1996) and Donald Rubin (1987) 
for more details. MI essentially provides an estimate for a missing value based on the 
conditional expectation of the value using other information provided by the household and by 
similar households. In addition, each missing value is replicated five times, which provides for 
five separate observations (implicates) for each household. The mean of any variable or point 
estimate from a regression is the average of the value from the five implicates. The standard 
error of an estimate is the average of the standard error for the five implicates, plus an 
adjustment for the five implications. If bi is a parameter estimate, Si is the corresponding 
standard error of the estimate, and Vi is the variance of the estimate, where i equals 1 to the 
number of implicates (in this case 5) then the adjustment to the variance equals the variance of 
the five parameter estimates, 
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The greater the differences among the parameter estimates for a particular variable are 
over the five implicates then the larger the standard error of the parameter estimates. An 
important implication is that there is an increased possibility of a type II error if the imputation 
variance is not accounted for. 
A related issue concerns the bootstrapping of standard errors for the regression 
parameter estimates. Bootstrapping involves resampling a data set to create a (large) number of 
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datasets with the same number of observations, n, as the original dataset but with observations 
included zero, one, two, or more times with each of the observations from the original dataset 
has a 
1
n chance of being included in each of the resamples.
 52 Since the SCF is not a random 
sample the standard bootstrapping procedure is not applicable. In anticipation of this difficulty 
the SCF includes a file of 999 bootstrap resamples for each of the survey years. The file contains 
a replicate weight and multiplicity factor for each observation that are used to create each of the 
bootstrap resamples. The weights and multiplicity factors are computed for the first implicate 
only. In computing bootstrapped standard errors of parameter estimates, I follow Pence who 
computes the bootstrap standard errors for the first implicate then adjusts this standard error 
for the imputation variance as described above. 
                                                        
52 Christopher Z. Mooney and Robert D. Duval (1993) is a very readable introduction to bootstrapping. 
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Appendix B: General-to-Specific Modeling 
I begin with a general model that includes a large number of explanatory variables then 
eliminate the variable with the least statistical significance from this general model; this model 
is tested against the general model. If this more specific model is not rejected as being different 
from the general model the next least significant variable is eliminated and this model is tested 
against the general model. The process of eliminating variables continues until a model is 
significantly different from the general model; this specific model is then used for the analysis. 
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Appendix C: Interpretation of Dichotomous Variables in Logit Estimations 
Typically in logit models the marginal effect is the change in probability that the 
response variable changes from zero to one given an incremental change in the average of the 
explanatory variable of interest. However, this does not make sense for dichotomous variables, 
i.e. whether or not a household also has an individual retirement account (IRA). Approximately 
36 percent of the sample has an IRA so the usual marginal effect could interpreted as the 
increase in probability of having a 401(k) loan as the household changes from having 36 percent 
to having 37 percent of an IRA. Steven B. Caudill and John D. Jackson (1989) suggest reporting 
the marginal effect as the difference between the probabilities when the variable equals one and 
when the variable equals zero. 
Suppose that there are n explanatory variables and 1x is the binary variable of interest 
then the change in the probability of participation as the household goes from 1 0x = to 1 1x = is 
n n n n
n n n n
x x x x
x x x x
0 1 2 2 0 2 2
0 1 2 2 0 2 2
exp( ) exp( )
1 exp( ) 1 exp( )
b b b b b b b
b b b b b b b
+ + + + +
-
+ + + + + + +
  (5) 
where the averages of the other explanatory variables are used, although the choice is somewhat 
discretionary. 
A further difficulty is with interpreting the categorical dummies: age groups, saving horizon, 
educational attainment, and income groups. Jeffrey Wooldridge (2000) suggests calculating the 
marginal effect as the household moves from a lower category to a higher one. For example, the 
marginal effect for the age 40 – 49 age group would have a more meaningful interpretation if 
calculated as the change in probability of having a 401(k) loan as the household moves from the 
30 – 39 age group to the older group. In this case, in the first term of (2) I set the value for the 
40 – 49, 50 – 59, and 60 – 69 age groups equal to zero and the 30 – 39 group equal to one. In 
the second term I set the values for the 30 – 39, 50 – 59, and 60 – 69 age groups equal to zero 
and the 40 – 49 age group equal to one. Similarly the savings horizon variables have the 
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interpretation of the change in probability of having an outstanding 401(k) loan as a household 
lengthens its savings horizon.53 
 
                                                        
53 The interpretation of the education and income group marginal effect is complicated somewhat by not having all 
of the income or education groups in the final model. It’s not possible to compute marginal probabilities as 
described for the age groups; instead these marginal effects should be read as t he change in probability as the 
household from not being in the group (i.e. the 30k to 50k income group) to being in the group. 
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